Blog Archives - g7plus

How Somalia made the IMF Supported Program Work and achieved debt relief

9vMFy6@2e@IH — Mon, 10 Mar 2025 02:19:49 +0000

Liban Obsiye

On 13th December 2024, Somalia reached the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) Completion Point to attain debt relief from the major creditors including the World Bank, African Development Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). This was a historic moment which showcased the Somali governments capacity to consistently deliver reforms in the most challenging circumstances and unchain its people from over 4.5 billion US Dollars of unsustainable debt. This was even more remarkable as the Somali authorities achieved this in amidst an active campaign against international terrorism in the form of Al-Shabaab, one of Al-Qaeda’s most dangerous affiliates globally. Moreover, alongside the economic reform program, Somalia was undergoing a period of political reflection and negotiations, which continues today, on its state formation process.

There’s a great amount written about the unpopularity and subsequent difficult results of IMF program conditionalities across the world but Somalia’s experience to date has been positive.

Somalia formed its first internationally recognized government after decades of conflict and ineffective and weak provisional administrations in 2012 when Dr. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was elected in his first term of office. This ushered in a new period of political reconciliation, stability and hope. Following this, the Somali Federal government focused on institution building through the restoration of the Central Bank, strengthening of public financial management systems, capacity building of civil servants and rebuilding the Somali security apparatus to combat the scourge of international terrorism at home.

Somalia’s re-engagement with the IMF resumed in 2015 after a long period of suspension following the civil war in 1991. After this point Somalia’s first Staff Monitored Program was agreed. The initiation of this debt relief roadmap and the engagement with the IMF allowed for the identification and consolidation of key economic and fiscal reform priorities and brought greater focus and discipline to the nascent Somali government systems and processes.

The factors that affected Somalia’s program success with the IMF were many but the most important of this was absolute and honest commitment from both the Somali government and the IMF staff working with them. In all matters of reform of any nature anywhere, it is fundamental that there is genuine common understanding of where things are, how they can be improved and who is responsible for implementing what.

On its part, the Somali government was committed to the reform program because it saw it as its own. This national ownership and responsibility were felt very deeply across the Somali government, lawmakers and public because the program was designed in a strategic manner to respond to Somalia’s macro-economic, fiscal, public financial management and governance needs and priorities to re-join the international financial architecture from which it was absent from for the best part of almost 3 decades. It was also sequenced in a way that interlocked reform impacts and ensured successful implementation to incrementally build public confidence in the government institutions and actions. Furthermore, there was already an element of collective frustration with the status quo and global financial pariah status by all Somali stakeholders, including the long-suffering business community which had limited access to external capital for investment and growth unlike their counterparts in the Horn of Africa and the wider African continent.

Somalia’s contribution to promoting the global discourse on national ownership of reforms through the g7+ and in multiple forums won it much respect and admiration from international partners who were encouraged by the enormous level of national commitment and investment from the Somali government and people on transforming their future.

In addition to the above, there was effectively targeted strategic communication from the beginning which created a national reform narrative championed by the government, media, civil society and international partners and informed by public dialogue and debate on the IMF benchmarks and their purpose and impact. This narrative simultaneously engaged all key audiences including the Somali public, business community and international partners. Today, the reforms have become a source of national and international pride and above day-to-day politicking given the successful debt relief outcomes. This consensus on the reforms was, and remains, a huge achievement in Somalia’s highly contested politicised governance ecosystem and supports the implementation of the new 3-Year IMF successor program which the authorities are engaged in today.

Another factor that really matters in the successful delivery of IMF Supported Programs in fragile states like Somalia is the provision of technical assistance and a flexible and understanding approach from the IMF. Contrary to existing criticism of the IMF as dishing out the same medicine of public austerity to all borrowers from its concrete Washington DC base, this program with Somalia was treated with the unique care it required and deserved. In fact, in the last two decades, the IMF has made great effort to better understand and work with fragile states based on their circumstances rather than enforce a one size fits all approach. Furthermore, there is a new approach from all International Financial Institutions that is guided by the timely idea that economic reforms and macroeconomic stability are global public goods rather than just individual state problems and priorities. This new holistic burden sharing approach is more useful and realistic given the devastating impact of external shocks like climate change and conflict and the consequent higher levels of sovereign indebtedness and low growth of most developing nations today which in some cases are spending more on climate response than education and healthcare despite been among the least emitters of Green House Gases in the world.

In addition to the above, there were also regular virtual and in-person program reviews which helped to smoothen the implementation process. The fact is that all nations are unique in their history, challenges and opportunities and most require capacity building and support with strengthening key economic institutions to successfully deliver reforms and the IMF continues to deliver on this in Somalia.

The IMF Somalia Country Fund, kindly financed by various supportive donors, provided vital and much needed expert technical assistance for core Somali institutions including the Ministry of Finance and Central Bank to improve budgeting, economic analysis, fiscal reporting, statistics, financial sector regulations and maintaining macroeconomic stability. Furthermore, other supportive international partners including the World Bank, African Development Bank, European Union and its member states, the United Kingdom and the USA focused their Technical Assistance support on helping to deliver on the reforms, build climate resilience and increase social sector investments. This helped to deepen understanding and accelerate the wider economic reform implementation while aiding basic public service delivery in education and healthcare.

Political fragmentation was always a major cause of Somalia’s instability since the collapse of the state in 1991. This is the same in all fragile states today. Yet, the economic reform program with the IMF became a fundamental part of the state building process which created unity across the political divide. The commitment to de-politicise the reforms to start tackling multi-dimensional poverty, create jobs and address the nations unsustainable debts was a landmark achievement which continues today with a refocused lens on economic growth post debt relief. This political maturity and economic foresight would have arguably not been so strong in Somalia’s fragmented political process without the constant risk of failing to relief the nation of over $4 billion Dollars of unsustainable suffocating debt.

In conclusion, IMF Supported Programs will only be as effective and successful as both governments and the IMF partnership allows. Political commitment, national ownership, and open, accountable, and mutually reinforcing working relations are at the centre of making IMF-supported programs work in any country. Additionally, it is fundamental for both the government and IMF to consider compensatory actions to mitigate measures that can offset the difficult effects of some reforms to maintain public support and implementation success. This is Somalia’s experience and I hope many other nations in similar situations, including those in the g7+, can learn from this.

The author is the g7+ Focal Person for Somalia and Executive Director of Somalia’s National Climate Fund. He also serves as the Senior Adviser to the Minister of Finance. Previously, he was the Chief Policy Coordinator and Head of the Strategic Economic Unit at the Ministry of Finance of Somalia.

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O futuro dos “Estados frágeis” na “nova guerra fria

9vMFy6@2e@IH — Mon, 23 Sep 2024 04:43:07 +0000

“The divided attention of world powers and their fragmentation have increased uncertainty and instability in fragile countries. Many of these have been battlegrounds for regional powers and hegemonic conflicts.”

Habib Urrehman Mayar

Deputy Secretary General of the g7+ Secretariat, based in Dili, Timor-Leste. Since joining in 2013, he has helped shape policy and advocacy initiatives to build peace, resilience and development in fragile states. He was Head of the Aid Coordination Unit at the Afghanistan Ministry of Finance and is the author of several blogs and a chapter in the Handbook of Fragile States.

Over the past three years, the world has experienced unprecedented uncertainty. The COVID-19 pandemic, followed by the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, has significantly undermined global peace and stability. These crises, magnified by globalization, highlight the reality that no one is safe until everyone is safe. However, the impact on already fragile states has been particularly severe. These countries, already struggling with decades of conflict and reliance on international aid, are now facing further challenges due to cuts in Official Development Assistance (ODA) and peacebuilding funds, as indicated by the OECD. Such reductions have drastic social, economic, and political consequences, with estimates suggesting that a 1% cut in aid can push 400,000 people into emergency situations. Fragile states, which comprise 24% of the world’s population, are projected to be home to nearly 80% of the world’s poorest people by 2030, a stark reminder of the urgency to eradicate extreme poverty.

Geopolitical Fragmentation and Fragile States:

The divided attention of global powers and their fragmentation have heightened uncertainty and instability in fragile countries. Many of these countries have been battlegrounds for regional powers and hegemonic conflicts. For instance, 38% of intrastate wars (civil wars) have been internationalized, meaning external states have provided troops to one or more warring groups. This figure is high by post-Cold War standards and likely underrepresents the true extent of internationalized conflicts, as it does not account for support through arms, money, or proxy forces. Such conflicts are deadlier and longer-lasting, undermining international institutions and diminishing the effectiveness of multilateralism. They often stem from unresolved social and political wounds from previous wars. As a citizen of Afghanistan, I have firsthand experience of how instability marked by regime changes, wars, and conflicts has become the norm, even decades since the start of the Cold War.

The “New Cold War” and Its Impact:

In the current geopolitical climate, termed the “New Cold War,” fragile countries are again becoming battlegrounds for hegemonic dominance. Political crises, fragility, and poverty in the least developed countries of the global south have attracted the attention of the regional and global players which are not multiple unlike the cold war right after world war II. In addition, these conditions, which could have been mitigated with long-term stability policies, now provide breeding grounds for undue interference such as international terrorism, undue interference in domestic affairs and hence proxy wars. In the pursuit of their narrow national interest, the regional and global hegemons are attempting to exert undue influence. For instance, since the war in Ukraine, Russia has sought to rekindle Soviet-era ties with nations in the Global South, especially in Africa.

Challenges with the conventional International Engagement:

Despite hosting peacekeeping, humanitarian, and development assistance missions for decades, many fragile countries remain disillusioned with their effectiveness in achieving self-reliance and long-lasting stability. Countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mali, and Somalia have asked UN missions to leave, reflecting deep-rooted disappointments with the conventional international engagement framework. Fragility and poverty in these countries are not inevitable but result from the international community’s failure to address root causes proactively and effectively. International engagements have predominantly been guided by the neoliberal policies of donors and global powers, often without sufficient consideration of the national context and the vision of long-term stability. These cooperation efforts are frequently viewed through the lens of the national security interests of donor countries.

The g7+; a new voice of “fragile countries”:

Against the backdrop of ineffective international engagement, a coalition of 20 conflict-affected countries formed the g7+ to pursue a vision of stability and development in 2010. With headquarters in Dili, Timor-Leste, and offices in Lisbon and New York, the g7+ provides an influential platform for dialogue on addressing fragility and conflict. The g7+ operates on the principle that there can be no development without peace and that peace can be sustained with development. National dialogue, truth, and reconciliation have been crucial for lasting peace in member countries like Timor-Leste, South Africa, and Rwanda. The g7+, along with OECD-DAC donors and civil society, agreed on these principles, forming the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, a landmark framework endorsed by over 45 countries and international organizations during the 4th High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, Korea, in 2011.

Despite recognizing fragility as a core issue leading to instability, poverty, and political crises, the international community has failed to support stability effectively in these contexts. The New Deal principles have been reduced to technical tools, requiring political will for adherence. Various global frameworks recognize the nexus among humanitarian, peacekeeping, and development actions and the indispensability of addressing fragility for global peace. However, they have failed to reform international policies affecting fragile countries. The New Deal became a technical tool discourse whereas it was supposed to pursue reforms in the international development cooperation that would require political will.

The challenges faced by fragile states are not insurmountable. With the right international support and policies that focus on long-term stability and development, these countries can transition from fragility to resilience. The g7+ advocates for several key solutions to make a difference in fragile countries:

Support National Processes of Dialogue and Reconciliation: Nationally owned and led processes of truth and reconciliation can help achieve national cohesion, a critical condition for stability and conflict prevention. Lessons from g7+ countries and elsewhere, such as Rwanda, demonstrate the effectiveness of these processes. Given the exogenous factors stemming from colonization to the Cold War, international actors have an indispensable role in the pursuit of peaceful resolutions to conflicts in fragile countries.

For instance, if the United States and its allies had prioritized supporting a true intra-Afghan dialogue with the goal of saving the republic, Afghanistan might have experienced a different outcome. The international community’s commitment to genuine reconciliation and support for Afghan-led peace initiatives could have laid the groundwork for sustainable peace and stability, preventing the prolonged suffering and chaos that ensued.

This underscores the need for international engagements to be genuinely aligned with the long-term stability goals of fragile states, rather than being driven by the immediate security concerns of donor nations. By focusing on the root causes of conflicts and supporting inclusive, nationally driven peace processes, the international community can play a transformative role in helping fragile states achieve lasting peace and development.

Long term vision of self-reliance and resilience: Addressing fragility cannot be reduced to a series of short-lived, project-based interventions. While aid often serves as a political tool for donor countries, it can have a tremendous impact if driven by a long-term vision of self-reliance and institution building. Stability and resilience in these countries is equally in the interest of developed nations even if we had to deduct aid to narrow national interest. Instability and fragility are the bid source of refugee crises. Achieving resilience in institutions and governance is a time-consuming process that requires sustained commitment and strategic planning.
Support Democracy and Freedom: Fragile countries have a strong aspiration for freedom and democracy. Despite setbacks like regime changes in Afghanistan and Guinea, many fragile countries rank high on freedom indices. International efforts should strengthen democratic means for resolving conflicts and governance rooted in these countries’ cultures and histories.
Multilateralism is the last resort for fragile countries: Multilateral institutions and processes are the last resort for conflict-affected countries. However, the dominance of global powers within these institutions has often undermined multilateral processes and frameworks. While the role of multilateralism in addressing the multiple challenges facing the world is undeniable, it is crucial that their policies include voices from least developed and developing countries. The influence of global powers within multilateral institutions can skew priorities and policies, often sidelining the needs of more vulnerable countries. It is essential to address these power imbalances to ensure that all countries and particular the conflict affected countries that have been among the farthest left behind, have an equal say in decision-making processes. This can be achieved through reforms that promote greater equity and transparency within these institutions

Conclusion:

Fragile countries have long been victims of colonization, the Cold War, proxy wars, and now climate change—problems for which they bear little responsibility. Even during periods of relative global peace, these countries suffered due to the legacy of fragility. The recent geopolitical fragmentation has once again made these countries battlegrounds for hegemonic contests. Instability and fragility in these countries will not remain confined within their borders in an interconnected world. Therefore, global stability and peace depend on investing in resilience in these countries. It is a shared responsibility, particularly for the global West, to support these efforts and contribute to global peace and stability.

The future of fragile states in the context of the “New Cold War” is fraught with challenges but also opportunities. By learning from past mistakes and adopting a more inclusive and proactive approach, the international community can help these countries achieve peace and development. The g7+ remains committed to advocating for the needs of fragile states and working towards a more equitable and stable world.

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The Future of “Fragile States,” in the “New Cold War”

9vMFy6@2e@IH — Sat, 21 Sep 2024 16:57:04 +0000

Habib Urrehman Mayar

Geopolitical Fragmentation and Fragile States:

The “New Cold War” and Its Impact:

Challenges with the conventional International Engagement:

The g7+; a new voice of “fragile countries”:

Support National Processes of Dialogue and Reconciliation: Nationally owned and led processes of truth and reconciliation can help achieve national cohesion, a critical condition for stability and conflict prevention. Lessons from g7+ countries and elsewhere, such as Rwanda, demonstrate the effectiveness of these processes. Given the exogenous factors stemming from colonization to the Cold War, international actors have an indispensable role in the pursuit of peaceful resolutions to conflicts in fragile countries.

Long term vision of self-reliance and resilience: Addressing fragility cannot be reduced to a series of short-lived, project-based interventions. While aid often serves as a political tool for donor countries, it can have a tremendous impact if driven by a long-term vision of self-reliance and institution building. Stability and resilience in these countries is equally in the interest of developed nations even if we had to deduct aid to narrow national interest. Instability and fragility are the bid source of refugee crises. Achieving resilience in institutions and governance is a time-consuming process that requires sustained commitment and strategic planning.
Support Democracy and Freedom: Fragile countries have a strong aspiration for freedom and democracy. Despite setbacks like regime changes in Afghanistan and Guinea, many fragile countries rank high on freedom indices. International efforts should strengthen democratic means for resolving conflicts and governance rooted in these countries’ cultures and histories.
Multilateralism is the last resort for fragile countries: Multilateral institutions and processes are the last resort for conflict-affected countries. However, the dominance of global powers within these institutions has often undermined multilateral processes and frameworks. While the role of multilateralism in addressing the multiple challenges facing the world is undeniable, it is crucial that their policies include voices from least developed and developing countries. The influence of global powers within multilateral institutions can skew priorities and policies, often sidelining the needs of more vulnerable countries. It is essential to address these power imbalances to ensure that all countries and particular the conflict affected countries that have been among the farthest left behind, have an equal say in decision-making processes. This can be achieved through reforms that promote greater equity and transparency within these institutions

Conclusion:

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Mitigating the impact of foreign interference: the role of national prevention strategies

9vMFy6@2e@IH — Mon, 24 Jun 2024 04:01:19 +0000

The case for national violence prevention strategies is strong, as argued in a recent publication by the NYU Center on International Cooperation (CIC)

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Multilateralism in an age of crises – Where do countries at the last mile of development fit in?

9vMFy6@2e@IH — Thu, 05 Oct 2023 07:55:27 +0000

Compounding global crises related to security, economics, the Covid-19 pandemic, and climate change disproportionally affect the poorest and conflict-affected countries.

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Trade for Peace

9vMFy6@2e@IH — Mon, 10 Jul 2023 03:20:18 +0000

The WTO Trade for Peace Podcast is a 30-minute conversation with trade for peace champions; the global policymakers, entrepreneurs and innovators committed to promoting trade as a key ingredient for lasting peace.

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Episode 2: Trusting local actors and solutions in conflict affected countries

9vMFy6@2e@IH — Thu, 06 Jul 2023 06:35:12 +0000

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Invest in energy access for a resilient recovery from COVID-19 in fragile environments

9vMFy6@2e@IH — Mon, 18 Apr 2022 08:55:20 +0000

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Power planning in fragile and conflict-affected states

9vMFy6@2e@IH — Mon, 18 Apr 2022 08:54:29 +0000

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Powering up energy investments in fragile states

9vMFy6@2e@IH — Mon, 18 Apr 2022 08:53:21 +0000

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How to Combat Aid Ineffectiveness in a Fragile State?: Haiti’s Promising Journey

9vMFy6@2e@IH — Wed, 10 Mar 2021 09:58:15 +0000

By Mr. Marc Anglade, National Coordinator of the External Aid Mechanism, Haiti

Haiti, between the earthquake of 12 January 2010 and a succession of devastating hurricanes thereafter, has appeared in the news often over the past 10 years. Beyond its high exposure to natural shocks, the political crises are also making headlines. The successive “peyi lòk” (locked country in Creole), since July 2018, led to an institutional blockage which translated into a series of political events that exacerbated the already very deep socio-economic crisis of the country. These crises, combined with weak public policies, has resulted in 4.2 million people living with food insecurity in 2020; figures similar to Central Africa or Somalia. Yet, billions have been flowing into Haiti over the years. On average, the country receives $ 1 billion in official development assistance (ODA) each year – part of which is still devoted to humanitarian aid.

Against this backdrop, Haiti, through the Technical Secretariat of the Coordination Framework for External Aid, decided to participate in the 3rd Monitoring Round of the Global Partnership in 2018. This exercise was an opportunity to objectively and impartially assess the state of development cooperation. Although the results were published during a time of political crisis, they helped launch a substantive process to address the challenge of development inefficiency in Haiti.

Despite the constant commitment of development partners, hand-in-hand with government partners, to work towards more effective development, the results showed a deficit in the implementation of the effectiveness principles of the Busan Partnership Agreement. The exercise revealed a lack of alignment from international cooperation partners to government priorities and identified some difficulty on the part of the government in establishing clear development priorities, even though an aid coordination mechanism in the country exists.

In order to make the best use of the results published, work continued at a technical level through the production of a concept note presenting a diagnosis of the situation and a proposal to address the challenges. Concretely, with the technical support of the United Nations, the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation has identified the root causes of aid ineffectiveness in the country. The diagnosis included situation analysis, as well as a review of the effectiveness of the tools and mechanisms already in place. As part of this exercise, the 10 Global Partnership indicators to measure implementation of the effectiveness principles were used to identify strengths, weaknesses, threats and opportunities of the management system of international cooperation and development tools.

What do results show about Haiti’s development co-operation and what actions are we taking?

The result is clear: cooperation is poorly aligned and does not use national systems, and failures appear in the country’s aid monitoring system. The analysis highlighted a different form of cooperation – as a substitute for government – which cannot lead to growth and that was reflected in various analyses. Beyond the intrinsic dysfunctions of national planning which has not been reflected in short and medium-term strategic documents since 2016; It should be noted that humanitarian needs in Haiti – apart from those directly related to shocks – have become a regular need in Haiti. They are directly linked to development deficits, with deep-seated structural and systemic problems, which at times are so complex to resolve that they become gordian knots. Humanitarian needs are the symptoms and manifestations of these problems – issues of political, economic and institutional governance in particular.

A New Public Policy

Faced with this reality, the second part of the work began. How to respond to such challenges which come from the intrinsic fragility of the country? Two elements appeared. On the one hand, it remains essential in a fragile context to put in place processes resistant to political crises and shocks that disrupt national planning. This is why Haiti has embarked on the elaboration of a public policy of international cooperation and management of external aid for 2021.

This public policy will aim to provide Haiti with a strategic framework for the implementation of its international cooperation relations with a special focus on South-South relations. It will also provide a framework for the management of external cooperation that will allow for the framing of international cooperation projects and programs using a multi-sectoral approach and revitalizing the Coordination Framework for External Aid. This policy will be carried out through broad consultation using the “whole-of-society” approach and a study to establish the impact of development cooperation in Haiti.

A Roadmap and Action Plan

Moreover, the country aims to address its fragility through collective action. The ultimate goal of development cooperation is to support Haiti in achieving the sustainable development goals. Thus, the government finalized its roadmap and its action plan for the implementation of the SDGs. This Konbit pou Devlopman (the konbit brings together all the actors of a community to carry out a common action for the good of all) aims to involve all the actors of the Haitian society so they achieve hand-in-hand the objectives of sustainable development. The roadmap, therefore, establishes an approach that takes into account all the necessary aspects for the country’s development: from national planning tools to raising awareness among all layers of society. During the first SDG week from 1 to 3 December 2020, government actors, the private sector, development workers, civil society organizations, the diaspora, and experts in development financing discussed the roadmap. Its adoption should make it possible to finalize a partnership framework between Haiti and its development partners, that would ensure all actors are committed to achieve the SDGs which guide every stage of Haiti’s development.

Looking Ahead: Action Dialogue 2021

Haiti has chosen a united and transparent response where effective partnerships are the very essence of future actions that will be carried out in 2021. As part of these efforts, Haiti is also among the first countries to confirm its participation in the Action Dialogue 2021, a flagship initiative launched by the Global Partnership Co-Chairs, that encourages countries to reflect on what effective development co-operation means for them today and how they can strengthen the effectiveness of co-operation and partnerships in the spirit of a ‘whole-of-government’ and ‘whole-of-society’ approach to sustainable development. This initiative will help enrich Haiti’s new public policy on international cooperation and management of external aid.

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Disclaimer

This article originally published in the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation Website.

https://www.effectivecooperation.org/content/how-combat-aid-ineffectiveness-fragile-state-haitis-promising-journey

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Prioritizing Fragile and Conflict Affected States in a Post Pandemic World

9vMFy6@2e@IH — Thu, 28 Jan 2021 10:19:41 +0000

By Jorge Moreira da Silva, Director, OECD Development Co-operation Directorate, and Helder da Costa, General Secretary of the g7+ Secretariat

Every country has been affected by the concurrent climate, pandemic and economic shocks of 2020. But they pose a severe threat to fragile and conflict affected states with specific needs that must be addressed in 2021. Already the least able to cope, these states urgently require leadership and collective responses at scale to mitigate the multifaceted impact of systemic shocks and build pathways to sustainable peace and prosperity.

One year into the Decade of Action, fragile and conflict-affected states are at a critical juncture. Even before the pandemic, the furthest behind were falling further behind on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In 2020, before COVID-19, the 57 fragile states identified by the OECD’s States of Fragility 2020 report were home to almost a quarter of the world population, but approximately three-quarters of all those living in extreme poverty globally. Thirteen extremely fragile states (including nine members of the g7+ group) were identified as being particularly at risk of being left behind from progress on sustainable development and peace relative to their peers. No fragile states are on track to meet the SDGs on hunger, health, gender equality and women’s empowerment.

The combined impact of global shocks is increasing pressure in many fragile states where violence is already disproportionately concentrated. In 2019, 65% of the population of fragile states were exposed to active state-based conflict, while 14 of the top 20 states most affected by terrorism were fragile. Despite the ceasefire call issued by the UN Secretary General in April 2020 in response to the pandemic, violent conflict displaced 660,000 people between April and May alone, adding further burdens to fragile states already hosting half of the world’s refugees. Within these trends lie further layers of fragility. In addition to state based violence, there has been a spike in domestic violence, pointing to the long-lasting impact of COVID-19, deepening poverty, inequality and undermining protection in fragile and conflict-affected states. Reduction in daily incomes and remittances has caused financial stress for families who have no alternative means to livelihood. Falling oil prices in the global market has hurt those fragile states that depend highly on revenue from oil and gas. Furthermore, the global economic impacts of the crisis make it uncertain whether official development assistance (ODA) volumes can rise or hold steady to meet growing needs.

Confronting these multifaceted socio economic challenges requires urgent and coordinated responses across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus. ODA is a critical resource for fragile and conflict –affected states. The latest available data shows that more net bilateral ODA – USD 76 billion – went to fragile contexts in 2018 than ever before, and in extremely fragile contexts, ODA amounted to 11.5 times the level of foreign direct investment (FDI) and 2.5 times the amount of remittances. As financial pressures crystallise in 2021, ODA must be protected as best as possible. Finding and pursuing sustainable development pathways should be the overarching long-term goal of aid programmes. The sustainability of government and civil society financing, while challenging, is a critical component of this goal. All actors across the nexus must be involved to respond effectively to COVID-19, by supporting socio-economic development programmes; pursuing peacebuilding and conflict prevention; and delivering humanitarian aid when necessary. Protecting ODA alongside resourcing peacebuilding and conflict prevention is a way to address global inequalities. Ensuring that the delivery of the COVID-19 vaccine does not become another example of global inequality would be a positive signal of intent to fragile states in 2021.

The fragmentation of peacebuilding, state building and conflict prevention efforts, damages accountability and fosters dependence. DAC members spent 25% of their ODA on humanitarian assistance to fragile contexts but only 4% on prevention and 13% on peacebuilding in 2018. Current mechanisms for conflict prevention, peacebuilding and statebuilding at multilateral and local levels are often disjointed, projectised, overstretched, and under-resourced at a time when they are vital for mitigating the impact of global shocks. In recent years, this decline in international co-operation (particularly in peacekeeping), in preference for independent actions beyond multilateral structures, undermines operational effectiveness, political trust, legitimacy and sustainable local outcomes. Moving past ad hoc reactions to crises means introducing measures that respond earlier to signs of fragility and resilience and that nurture stability. For example, policy commitments for the equal and meaningful participation of women in conflict prevention and peacebuilding should address persistent shortfalls – between 1992 and 2018, women made up 3% of mediators, 13% of negotiators and 4% of signatories in major peace processes. Alongside groups such as g7+, international partners must respond to the voice of countries furthest behind.

There is much to be learned from analysing the impact of 2020’s shocks and many of the lessons point to the importance of refreshing existing structures and ideas. Examples of resilient capacity in areas such as social protection, point to gateways for building localised approaches that contribute to the development of social cohesion, peace and stability. Collective action on crisis coordination, prevention and peacebuilding, and the protection of global public goods, can be empowered through country-owned dialogue, reconciliation, and peer learning in fragile and conflict-affected states. The New Deal principles, endorsed a decade ago, matter more than ever. As exemplified in Sierra Leone and Somalia, when applied in the manner intended, they have proven to be an effective framework for cohesive approaches to building peace and stability. Innovative thinking on accountability is reshaping the conversation on national ownership with the potential to renew the operational implementation of the peacebuilding and statebuilding goals of the New Deal. The insight of organisations such as g7+ in fora such as the UN General Assembly and the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, will be critical to renew statebuilding, prioritise conflict sensitivity, and support national institutions to manage the effects of the crisis while capitalising on opportunities to build back better.

Source of the article: https://oecd-development-matters.org/2021/01/27/prioritising-fragile-and-conflict-affected-states-in-a-post-pandemic-world/

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Fragile countries call for cooperation in battle against COVID-19

9vMFy6@2e@IH — Thu, 21 Jan 2021 03:51:18 +0000

by Michelle Kovacevic / in News

Pandemic response highlights resilience of already-fragile countries

On 22 February 2020, South Sudan established a national unity transitional government, putting an end to a conflict that lasted six years. Less than a month later, the COVID-19 pandemic hit.

The government reacted quickly, taking measures to prevent the spread of the disease, including suspending flights, closing schools and non-essential businesses, and putting a curfew in place. Neighbouring countries began restricting their cereal exports, leading many in South Sudan to stock up on food, and prices of essential items like maize rose by 36%. Restrictions on movement meant smallholder farmers and traders struggled with accessing markets, essential tools and quality seed.

Compounding these challenges, the sharp fall in global oil prices has significantly impacted government revenue, which depends on crude oil for 98% of its budget. “The sudden drop in revenue makes it more challenging to finance a comprehensive national response to COVID-19. We are working together with government and partners to build on the inherent resilience capacity of the South Sudanese people and reduce their vulnerability, especially to the COVID-19 pandemic,” said Jose Manzano, UNDP’s Senior Programme Advisor in South Sudan.

Least prepared to respond

On the current trajectory, up to two-thirds of the world’s poor will live in fragile and conflict-affected countries by 2030, according to the World Bank. And, as the COVID-19 crisis unfolds, those countries are least prepared to respond. According to the recently launched COVID-19 and Human Development Report, the world’s poorest countries have, on average, 2.5 doctors and 7 hospital beds per 10,000 people.

“If we take Yemen as an example, only 51% of health facilities are fully operational. This means two-thirds of Yemenites have no access to basic healthcare,” Luisa Bernal, Policy Specialist at UNDP, said.

“And then you add sanitation and hygiene issues where people don’t have access to clean water and it means the simplest action you can take to protect yourself and your family – washing your hands – is just not feasible.”

According to the UN High Commissioner for R efugees, every day 37,000 people are forced to flee their homes because of persecution and violence. More than 70 million people have been forcibly displaced worldwide, many of whom are living in overcrowded settlements.

“Refugees and displaced populations are particularly vulnerable groups and the pandemic and measures to halt its spread is increasing the strain on host communities to provide support and essential services. It’s a very difficult situation,” said Bernal.

“If we take Yemen as an example, only 51% of health facilities are fully operational. This means two-thirds of Yemenites have no access to basic healthcare.”

– Luisa Bernal, UNDP Policy Specialist

Thankfully, the number of coronavirus cases in most fragile countries is still relatively low. But, the socioeconomic implications of the global, regional and local countermeasures to COVID-19 are already hitting fragile countries harder than others, said Habib Ur Rehman Mayar, Deputy General Secretary of the g7+, an intergovernmental organisation representing 20 fragile and conflict-affected countries.

“In Somalia, for example, 49% of revenue comes from remittances. This has dropped by more than 50?cause of lockdown measures in the US and UK that has meant Somalis working there have lost their jobs. Now they don’t have any money to send back to family in Somalia who depend on this financial support,” Mayar said.

Reframing international support

The g7+ enables fragile countries to share experiences and join together to advocate for country-led and country-owned processes in addressing fragility and conflict. The group was formed out of a need to improve the effectiveness of international aid.

“Fragile states have often been referred to as failing states or failed states. This terminology implies that these countries do not have capacity to even understand their own problems, which is not true,” Mayar said.

“We are trying to change that narrative. We say ‘yes, our institutions and economies are fragile’, because of decades of war or natural and manmade disasters, but it doesn’t mean that the populations and leaders lack the understanding of their own challenges and solutions.”

“We advocate that the international community let these countries define their challenges and identify their needs and provide them with the needed support to achieve stability rather than imposing solutions that are not context sensitive,” Mayar said.

The g7+ recently launched a call for support to curb COVID-19 in fragile countries. They’re calling for a full and permanent global ceasefire, scaled up healthcare assistance, care for displaced people stranded due to border closures, debt relief and investments in food security, regional cooperation, technological innovation and alternative sources of financing.

“The first priority for people in countries that are in conflict is to make and build peace. This is the time to realise that we all have one common enemy and that’s COVID-19.”

“Peace will depend on economic and social wellbeing, and also protecting the development gains that have been made.”

“The first priority for people in countries that are in conflict is to make and build peace. This is the time to realise that we all have one common enemy and that’s COVID-19.”

– Habib Ur Rehman Mayar, g7+ Deputy General Secretary

In the response phase, Bernal said, they are focusing on supporting the continued function of the public and private sector, particularly small- and medium-sized enterprises.

South Sudan is intending to set up mobile markets and rolling stores to address food security issues brought about by COVID lockdowns. This approach will enable traders, producers and healthcare professionals to provide communities across the country with access to food, essential items and information.

The recovery phase focuses on ways to utilise this crisis to seize opportunities to improve long-term outcomes and build resilience. One of the ways the UN is facilitating this is through its Connecting Business Initiative – a platform to connect global capabilities with in-country needs.

“The private sector has of course been affected by COVID-19 but it can also be a respondent and a partner in supporting governments and stakeholders through the crisis,” Bernal said.

“For instance, we’ve seen long truck queues at border crossings because drivers are required to undertake COVID testing. Connecting countries with companies that have experience in efficient trade facilitation measures could help introduce effective but less restrictive measures that benefit the country beyond this crisis,” she said.

Remembering our humanity

Sustaining peace requires the international community to step up its support for economic recovery, Mayar said.

“We hope that fragile countries are given debt relief. Their meager resources are rarely enough to provide needed care to their citizens during COVID-19. Failing to do so threatens the foundation of stability in these countries, most of which are on the verge of relapsing into crisis that will become a global threat,” he said.

Mayar hopes to raise awareness among the international community and in people around the world as to the plight of people living amid fragility and conflict, and who are experiencing the pandemic’s impacts on top of that.

“People in fragile countries have lived in lockdowns and curfews for months and in situations where even getting their basic necessities becomes a nightmare,” he said.

“Sometimes politics in international relations is guided on the assumptions of realism where actions of states are motivated by their respective national interest. We can forget that we are all one human family, dependent on each other.”

“I hope that this crisis helps nations and their leaders realise that we all can survive challenges like COVID-19 only if we cooperate with each other.”

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Weakest, Most Fragile States Will Be Those Worst Affected by COVID-19 in Medium, Long Term, Humanitarian Chief Tells Security Council

9vMFy6@2e@IH — Wed, 20 Jan 2021 03:22:55 +0000

Top peacekeeping and humanitarian affairs officials warned the Security Council during a 9 September video conference meeting that wide-ranging implications of the COVID-19 pandemic could erode peace and push more conflict?affected nations onto its agenda.

Mark Lowcock, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, briefing the Council on the implementation of resolution 2532 (2020) that called for a global ceasefire amid the pandemic, said the weakest, most fragile and conflict-affected countries will be those worst affected by COVID-19 in the medium and long term.”Woefully inadequate economic and political action will lead to greater instability and conflicts in the coming years; more crises will be on this Council’s agenda,” he said. “While we may have been surprised by the virus, we cannot say the same of the security and humanitarian crises that most certainly lay ahead if we don’t change course.”

With more than 26 million confirmed cases of COVID-19 globally, he said “the virus is everywhere”. More than 860,000 people have died, roughly a third of these cases and fatalities in countries affected by humanitarian or refugee crises, or those facing high levels of vulnerability. Indirect effects of the crisis will be higher poverty, lower life expectancy, more starvation, less education and more child death. Likewise, given recent research findings, the risks of conflict, instability, insecurity, violence and population displacement are rising, he said, adding that “the agenda of this Council, which you may think is big enough already, is set to grow; that may be one of the main lasting effects of the pandemic.”

In addition, these indirect consequences “are dwarfing the impact of the virus itself”, he cautioned. Vaccination campaigns have been disrupted in 45 countries facing humanitarian or refugee crises or high levels of vulnerability from other causes, putting more than 80 million children under the age of one at risk of vaccine-preventable diseases. Meanwhile, the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) report that food insecurity is spiking, with 27 countries at risk. More than half a billion children in humanitarian crises and fragile contexts have been affected by school closures, many girls now unable to go to school will never go back and gender-based violence is increasing as services have been curtailed.

“There is little dispute about what ought to be done,” he said. While the Group of 20 and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations have adopted $10 trillion in domestic stimulus measures to protect their populations, low-income and fragile countries do not have the resources. They rely on support from elsewhere, but only 7 per cent of the $143 billion in financing from the international financial institutions has been committed to low?income countries. This alarmingly low level of support increases the likelihood of the pandemic generating dangerous long-term consequences, he said, underlining the critical role international financial institutions can play. Indeed, recent experience has shown that costs to taxpayers are minimal because the resources can largely be generated off the international financial institutions’ own balance sheets.

Turning to the response of humanitarian agencies, he said the Secretary?General’s launch in March of the United Nations coordinated Global Humanitarian Response Plan for COVID-19 now seeks $10 billion over the next six months to support 250 million people in 63 countries. Expressing appreciation at having raised around $2.4 billion since March, he outlined some ongoing efforts, including personal protective equipment for 730,000 health workers, information on the virus and protection instructions for more than 1 billion people in nearly 60 countries and distance learning for almost 100 million children. However, the Secretary-General’s repeated calls on Member States and others to facilitate the movement of humanitarian personnel and cargo have not been adequately heeded, violence against health workers is rising and aid workers are also vulnerable to the virus. The number of confirmed cases among United Nations staff alone runs into the thousands, and the death toll is mounting. Where possible, those who are most sick are evacuated to places where they can get good medical care, but, too often, that does not happen, he said, paying tribute to those taking extraordinary risks with their own welfare in the desire to help others.

Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, highlighting increased political risks during the pandemic, said the erosion of trust in public institutions “increases fragility and has the potential to drive instability in settings where people perceive authorities have not addressed the pandemic effectively or have not been transparent about its impact”.

The aggravation of certain human rights challenges also fuel conflict during the pandemic, she said, citing increased discrimination, gender-based violence and disproportionate impacts on women, as well as a rise in stigma and hate speech, especially against migrants and foreigners. Tensions are seen rising about decisions to postpone elections or to proceed with a vote, she said.

Despite these risks, she said that the dynamics of several ongoing armed conflicts have not changed as a result of COVID-19, with some situations having deteriorated largely due to other drivers. In the Sahel, the risk remains that parties to conflict use the uncertainty created by the pandemic to press their advantage.

In the short term, the pandemic could also derail fragile peace processes and conflict?prevention initiatives due to restrictions on travel and in-person contacts, she continued. “Our own ability to support political processes has certainly been limited by such restrictions,” she admitted. “With many of our engagements moving online, we have had to develop our digital skills and work even harder to nurture the trust and willingness to compromise that are at the heart of preventive diplomacy and mediation.”

Turning to the status of the Secretary-General’s global ceasefire call on 23 March, she said that the initial response was encouraging, with several temporary truces announced, from Colombia to Ukraine, and from the Philippines to Cameroon. However, many expired without extensions, resulting in little improvement on the ground. Recalling the Security Council’s backing for the ceasefire call in resolution 2532 (2020), she said leadership from the Council and the support of Member States with leverage are essential to changing the calculations of conflict parties, opening the space for dialogue and ending wars.

The United Nations has adapted operations amid the pandemic, including the creation of a joined-up support structure for missions. The cross-departmental field support group on COVID-19 has been working to strengthen United Nations risk management systems and to protect personnel and their capacity to continue critical operations, and missions are strongly committed to aid host countries in their COVID-19 response.

To mitigate COVID-19-related risks in situations of armed conflict and prevent the possible deterioration of other situations into instability and violence, the collective and individual engagement of Council members is indispensable, including in a follow up to the Secretary-General’s ceasefire call. “The better the global response to the pandemic, the better our prospects for the prevention, management and resolution of armed conflicts around the world,” she said.

Jean-Pierre Lacroix, Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, said the Council’s ongoing support will be indispensable as the world continues to address challenges posed by the pandemic. Briefing on measures being taken to address challenges facing peacekeeping operations and the countries where they are deployed, he said the pandemic has had a significant impact and has complicated efforts to support national authorities and other actors while discharging mission mandates. With the guidance and support of United Nations Headquarters and the Security Council’s unified and consistent backing, peacekeeping operations have quickly and effectively put in place a range of measures to ensure operational continuity and ongoing mandate implementation, he said, highlighting a strategy set up in April that focuses on supporting national authorities, protecting personnel, mitigating the virus’ spread and ensuring operational continuity.

However, he cautioned, many countries where peacekeeping operations are deployed suffer from a combination of weak health and governance structures and a lack of the resources required to effectively combat the pandemic. As such, the spread of COVID-19 can lead to exacerbated socioeconomic tensions, undermine governance and local institutions, slow down or derail fragile political processes, worsen already?volatile security situations and contribute to a recurrence of intercommunal conflict. The overall effect can be to further destabilize these countries and erode peace gains. The pandemic has also given rise to hate speech, incitements to violence and harmful misinformation. Moreover, heavier burdens face Governments already under pressure to deliver on political processes. In South Sudan, a considerable slowdown of implementing a ceasefire agreement is partly due to an increased focus on COVID-19-related challenges, at a time when parties have been in a three-month-long deadlock over appointing governors and have yet to reconstitute Parliament.

While these combined effects of the pandemic can negatively impact the missions’ mandate implementation, he said that helping to prevent and contain the virus’ spread where peacekeeping operations are deployed is not only a moral imperative, but also a political priority and an operational requirement. Measures are already contributing to preventing and containing the spread among field personnel, he said, noting that, as of today, across all field missions and their more than 100,000 personnel, a total of 1,049 cumulative cases had been recorded, with 609 recovered, 440 active cases and 18 deaths. The rotation and repatriation of uniformed personnel have resumed in close coordination with both police- and troop-contributing countries, and all missions have been provided with a COVID-19 risk mitigation plan. Peacekeeping operations continue to find innovative and proactive ways to implement their mandates, including a recent agreement in Sudan among transitional authorities and participating armed groups.

As the COVID-19 crisis abates in certain parts of the world, he said, missions see opportunities to achieve more. In Cyprus, for example, the quarantine and closure of crossing points restricted movement between the north and south of the island, and now both sides are working on the reopening together. Missions also continue to prevent and respond to threats to civilians, which have not decreased in the past six months despite the Secretary-General’s global ceasefire call, including in the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali. In operational terms, the pandemic has, however, affected the footprint of United Nations missions, and to a certain degree, their capacity to perform patrols or monitoring activities. Peacekeeping missions have been approaching their protection of civilians activities primarily through the lens of “do no harm”, prioritizing the need to prevent the virus from spreading among the local populations. Reductions in mission capacities have also affected the effectiveness of situational awareness tools, such as the use of air assets for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

During the pandemic, regular meetings have been held virtually, he said. The integrated effort by the Secretariat in support of peacekeeping operations is complemented by strengthened synergies with the United Nations country teams and sister organizations, including the World Bank, and with partner organizations on the ground, including the African Union and European Union. The role of women peacekeepers is key to addressing the COVID-19-related challenges to mandate implementation. As part of the response to the pandemic, the comprehensive performance assessment system has aided several missions in planning, tracking and showing the impact of their efforts to help prevent the spread of COVID-19 in their area of operations. This has strengthened their capacity both to support the host countries’ efforts and ensure continuing delivery of mandated activities.

Council members, commending peacekeepers and partners assisting in COVID-19 response plans, agreed that resolution 2532 (2020) is a step in the right direction, with many urging all parties to respect the Secretary-General’s call for a global ceasefire. Some shared concerns about escalating violence and the fragility of some States that are struggling to address the pandemic while brokering or building peace.

Tunisia’s delegate said that, while resolution 2532 (2020) marks the Council’s clear engagement, two months after its adoption, more must be done to translate its provisions into concrete reality on the ground. Today’s debate is a timely opportunity to reiterate the Council’s resolve, but the ceasefire appeal needs stronger diplomatic efforts. On the humanitarian front, the impact of COVID-19 on conflict-affected settings has been much worse than expected, he said, adding that: “If we fail to provide a coordinated international response to the pandemic, we would risk losing gains on health, poverty, education, women’s empowerment, development and stability.” Solidarity and unity at the international, regional and national level must guide the world though this volatile and unstable new phase, where assumptions about threats to international peace and security must evolve as humanity faces new types of enemies that are invisible, transboundary and global. To do this, he said, “we cannot face such dangers using the same instruments we have inherited from the old times”. As the nature and scope of threats evolve, it is imperative to rethink security and adapt approaches and tools. For its part, the Council must discuss these issues to be able to deliver on its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The representative of France said it is time for a collective awakening, with the top priority being the implementation of a cessation of hostilities and a humanitarian pause. Ending hostilities is an indispensable condition for an effective fight against the pandemic. While the Secretary-General’s appeal was supported by more than 180 countries, more than 20 armed groups and numerous regional and civil society organizations, much remains to be done, including in Syria, Yemen, Libya, Afghanistan and the Sahel. The Council must continue to support peacekeeping operations by enabling them to fully implement their mandates despite the pandemic. Turning to other concerns, he said the Council must collectively support the full and complete implementation of the Global Humanitarian Response Plan for COVID-19. France will continue to work to that end, he said, calling attention to the European Union’s efforts, including the coordination of more than 65 flights as part of a humanitarian airlift. Everything must be done to ensure safe and unimpeded humanitarian access and to protect aid workers and medical personnel. Stability and peace also depend on the resilience of health systems. The World Health Organization (WHO) must be strengthened in its normative, warning and coordinating role. Resolution 2532 (2020) recognizes the essential role that women play in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the negative and disproportionate effects that this health crisis has on women, girls, refugees and displaced persons, he said, noting that France and Mexico will organize the Generation Equality Forum in the first half of 2021, in partnership with the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women).

China’s delegate, noting that COVID-19 is still raging across the world, and some countries are seeing a looming second wave, said nothing is more important and urgent than combating the virus, saving lives and restoring peace. Hostilities should end, and parties to conflicts should stop fighting immediately and unconditionally. Life should be prioritized, and humanitarian assistance be increased, he said, emphasizing that WHO should be supported to mitigate the pandemic’s impact on fragile countries and vulnerable populations. Unilateral sanctions should be lifted to lessen the sufferings of affected peoples, he said, urging nations to lift coercive measures. Equal emphasis should be put on ceasefires and containing the pandemic. In the spirit of putting people’s lives first, China prevents and contains the pandemic in a comprehensive, prompt and effective manner, while promoting international cooperation, having sent 34 medical expert teams to 32 countries, provided 283 batches of anti-epidemic supplies to 150 countries and 4 international organizations, and exported medical supplies to more than 200 countries. Last week, China proposed an international mechanism on mutual recognition of COVID-related health certification. China President Xi Jinping announced at the World Health Assembly in May that a COVID-19 vaccine, when developed and deployed in the country, will be shared with other nations through various channels. Making vaccines accessible to everyone is the only way to realize universal health, he said, adding that: “We should stick to a win-win concept rather than [a] zero-sum mentality.” Vaccines should not be stockpiled or monopolized, nor should they be used as political tools. His delegation hopes to see countries cooperate to advance vaccine development and production, making them accessible and affordable to all, he said, noting that China is ready to join other countries in implementing resolution 2532 (2020), form a united front against the pandemic and build a community based on a shared future for mankind.

The representative of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines said resolution 2532 (2020) marked an important milestone for the Security Council and the wider multilateral system by successfully navigating divisions and divergent views to deliver a clear message of unity and hope. But, more must be done to preserve hard won gains across the peace-security-development nexus, especially since many parties have disregarded calls for a global ceasefire. Addressing COVID-19-related challenges will require the political will to fully implement resolution 2532 (2020). Approaches to managing the COVID-19 crisis must be conflict-sensitive and sovereignty supporting, she said, reiterating calls on all parties to abandon unilateral actions. She appealed for greater regional and international cooperation to better tackle arms trafficking, illicit exploitation and trade of natural resources and other activities that embolden armed groups and organized criminals. Only through a total cessation of hostilities will conflict?affected countries be able to manage this health crisis as they mend their social fabrics, advance peace processes and strengthen governance, she said, underlining the need to amplify calls for a global ceasefire and to strengthen capacities to assist those made most vulnerable.

Vietnam’s delegate said that the pandemic and its impacts have been alluded to in most if not all contexts on the Council’s agenda, multiplying and exacerbating the already difficult challenges of conflict-affected countries and populations. Going forward, a ceasefire is a must. The United Nations and regional organizations can and should continue to support effective implementation of the ceasefire, including through mediation efforts. People must be protected, so the Council must continue to galvanize collective efforts to assist conflict?affected countries in reinforcing preparedness, response and recovery from COVID-19 and to fight for sustainable peace. At the same time, peacekeeping remains an integral tool to multilateral strategies to establish a stable environment for sustaining peace and triggering development, which must be part of a long-term response to pandemics. It is essential that peacekeeping and political missions continue to make peace work in the “new normal”, he said, reiterating his delegation’s call for international cooperation and coordination in fighting the pandemic as no country is safe from and can fight COVID-19 alone.

The representative of the United States said that, in the early days of the virus, the Chinese Communist Party hid the truth about the outbreak from the world and prevented researchers from accessing vital information. The result was innumerable deaths that could have been prevented. The Party must answer to the parents around the world trying to home-school their children while working full?time jobs from home, those mourning loved ones without the ability to honour them with a funeral and those who have lost their jobs or their businesses. WHO’s failures in the early days of the pandemic also contributed to needless suffering and the worsening of this pandemic. The agency needs to reform, including by demonstrating its independence from China. Describing how significantly his country contributes to counter the pandemic, including the development of vaccines, he stressed that the Administration of United States President Donald J. Trump will continue to lead on this issue and will work hard to make the world safer and more secure from infectious disease threats.

The representative of the United Kingdom, responding to China’s remarks on sanctions, said “it’s a shame that there has been some intentional blurring of issues on sanctions and attempts to take advantage of a potential COVID-19-related tragedy”. His country and the European Union impose sanctions on Damascus, specifically targeting those responsible for human rights abuses against ordinary Syrians and those who support or benefit from the Assad regime’s “corruption and murderous activity”. Sanctions don’t apply to food, medicine, medical equipment or medical assistance. “Put simply, the problem facing Syria’s health sector is not sanctions, but rather that the regime is more intent on bombing hospitals than building them and the restrictions imposed on cross-border aid”. Humanitarian exemptions apply to sanctions regimes mitigating the impact of sanctions on humanitarian programmes. The issue in Syria is a chronic mismanagement of its economy by a corrupt regime and its friends.

Belgium’s representative, recalling that resolution 2532 (2020) adopted on 1 July called for a 90-day ceasefire, said that the outlook does not look promising and the call for a global ceasefire did not have the effect hoped for, while the COVID-19 pandemic is still spreading and weakening the health systems in conflict areas. Libya, Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan are just a few of the worrisome examples in this respect, he said, stressing the need to continue implementing that resolution. He urged Member States to provide the United Nations with the support it needs to implement its mandates, while commending the work done by the Organization in countering hate speech, mis- and disinformation, including through the “Verified” initiative. He also highlighted the plight of refugees and internally displaced children as education came under attack. “To fight these multiple crises, a coordinated global response is the only way forward,” he said.

Indonesia’s representative highlighted the need to step up calls for a global ceasefire, support the work of United Nations missions on the ground and ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Council resolution 2532 (2020) is merely a first step in addressing the impacts of COVID-19 to international peace and security, he said, emphasizing the importance of following it up with concrete actions. In the longer term, it is essential to ensure that disruptions created by the virus will not reverse the gains achieved in countries in conflict and post?conflict situations and think beyond pandemic response towards a comprehensive strategy. Indonesia, with five other United Nations Member States, took the initiative to launch the first General Assembly resolution on global solidarity to fight COVID-19, standing ready to contribute further in this concerted effort.

Estonia’s delegate said some countries that are ravaged by conflicts, violence and human rights violations have made dealing with the pandemic nearly impossible. As such, he reiterated the Secretary-General’s call for a humanitarian ceasefire. “We must focus our efforts to dealing with the pandemic, not fighting,” he said, citing cases where the pandemic was used as a pretext, including a campaign for lifting restrictive measures, a rise in disinformation and attacks against the health-care sector, both physical and cyber. Some Governments have curbed United Nations peacekeepers’ freedom of movement, which, in turn, affects the ability to help people in need. There are also undeniable risks posed by the pandemic for the rights of women, including through gender?based violence and violations of human rights. Women’s role in their societies’ response to COVID-19, including in conflict and post-conflict situations, is crucial, as they represent the majority of health workers. To beat the pandemic, he said, “we need to show solidarity and trust; we need to be transparent with each other. Without a coordinated response, we cannot win.”

South Africa’s delegate said the Secretary-General’s call for a global ceasefire has not been broadly respected, the pandemic has burdened countries affected by conflict, and some armed groups and terrorists have taken advantage of the impact of the coronavirus to intensify activities and launch attacks. South Africa urges parties to conflict to heed the call for a ceasefire, prioritize efforts to consolidate durable peace and stability, and allow for the safe delivery of, and access to, humanitarian assistance. Noting improvements to fast?track applications for humanitarian exemptions, he said the impact of sanctions and its resultant socioeconomic effects are preventing countries from effectively combating the pandemic, exposing already?vulnerable civilians. As such, he called on Council members to continue their efforts in this regard. He also supported the Secretary-General’s call to lift sanctions, given the broader impact of unilateral coercive measures. It is vital that the Security Council remains steadfast in its support of countries experiencing armed conflict, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic has illustrated that it is imperative for countries to cooperate closely in the face of global public health and other emergencies.

The representative of Niger, Council President for September, spoke in his national capacity, saying that the adoption of a resolution is never an end in itself. In fact, the adoption of a resolution on the COVID-19 pandemic, which echoes the Secretary?General’s call for a global ceasefire, calls for a sustained follow-up in more ways than one, because the political, economic, and above all, security repercussions will continue to manifest themselves in the years to come. In the Sahel, a region affected by climate change, armed conflicts and fragile health systems, the pandemic has added a new layer of challenges. The campaign of disinformation and stigmatization carried out by terrorist groups does not facilitate State efforts. The pandemic is seriously affecting the economies of African countries in general, and the Sahel in particular. Electoral processes under way in the region must receive greater support to avoid pre- and post-electoral crises. Resolution 2352 (2020) offers an opportunity to reaffirm the importance of international cooperation, multilateralism, the role of such global organizations as WHO and regional and subregional organizations in the fight against this pandemic. The cacophony and blame games at the beginning of the pandemic must give way to an awareness that all are potential victims unless stakeholders work collectively to find a vaccine against this dangerous virus. “We hope that, once a cure is found, it will be accessible to the weakest and the less fortunate,” he said, thanking China for its renewed commitment to this goal.

Also participating in the meeting were representatives of the Dominican Republic, Germany and the Russian Federation.

Based on information received from the Security Council Affairs Division

Resource of the Article;

https://press.un.org/en/2020/sc14296.doc.htm

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Q&A: Don’t forget to promote peace during pandemic, warns g7+ representative

9vMFy6@2e@IH — Thu, 21 May 2020 06:54:00 +0000

By Teresa Welsh // 19 May 2020 – The original article was first published at the Devex WASHINGTON

Countries suffering from conflict must not be neglected during the coronavirus pandemic, according to Habib Mayar, deputy secretary-general of the g7+, an organization of fragile and conflict-affected states. “Lockdowns or closures of borders or airports have created social and economic challenges for these countries where people mostly live in a hand-to-mouth situation,” Mayar said. “The institutions are fragile. They don’t have the capacity to respond to their needs — economic, social, or even health needs. If the situation persists, it might affect the current peace-building initiatives or the transition.”

How aid groups navigate the rules of war in Burkina Faso

Almost 1,000 civilians were killed in 2019 by local militias and fighters linked to Islamic militants in the country. Some aid groups say that officially defining the situation as an armed conflict would make it easier to operate.

The g7+ was established in 2010 in East Timor, growing out of conversations around aid effectiveness and challenges that conflict-affected countries had in achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Mayar said that although the original seven countries were from different regions all over the world, they identified commonalities and realized they could all benefit from sharing their experiences. “The underlying reason or cause for not achieving the MDGs was the lack of peace. We realized that unless you have peace, you cannot either achieve development or, even if you achieve it, you cannot sustain those gains,” Mayar said. In 2011, the g7+ countries signed the New Deal for Engagement in the Fragile States with development partners and civil society, recognizing the nexus between peace and development. The g7+ was formalized in 2014, and in 2019 it achieved observer status at the United Nations. The group focuses on what it calls “fragile-to-fragile cooperation” in areas of peace- and state-building and on advocating in the global arena for the needs of fragile states. Mayar spoke with Devex about what both g7+ national governments and the international community must be doing in the context of the pandemic to prevent disruption to peace processes and exacerbation of ongoing conflict.

What challenges does the COVID-19 pandemic pose to peace efforts around the world?

These countries are going to be affected badly by the consequences of the pandemic itself and also the countermeasures. Most of these countries are in important transition points of peace-building and state-building. The countermeasures have unintentionally created a situation where people will be forced into more hardship and important processes at the national level, like peace-building, will be hampered. The countermeasures will cause a crisis in many countries. Those already in conflict might see even greater challenges, because the pandemic has created [an] economic downturn in these countries, with aid expected to be reduced. While we are also hoping that this is an opportunity for peace or maybe this an opportunity for a cease-fire, we don’t see, in most of these conflict-affected countries, a promising sign of a reduction in violence. As we see that the overall global focus of the U.N. and also the multilateral will be on tackling the pandemic. We are hearing that resources in aid which were dedicated or committed to these countries might be restricted or might be diverted because of the global need [and] expected economic downturn. Most of these countries are dependent on aid.

What can national governments be doing to mitigate these negative effects?

Some countries — particularly in the g7+, like the West African countries which were affected by Ebola — they have a precedent of this kind of crisis there, and they might be better equipped with some tools. But those countries for which it didn’t have any precedent, the priority for them is to manage their meager resources and respond to the direct threats of COVID-19 in terms of providing health care to their people. But that’s not the only thing they’re struggling with. They’re also struggling with trying to fill the bridge of mistrust between the society and the government or the institution. That’s also directly related to maintaining stability. People might lose their trust in the institutions, which is already very low, and that’s one reason for the conflict. These countries are trying to fill that gap, to make people trust their institutions.

What about countries that are actively at war?

Those countries which are affected by conflict, which have an active conflict or war — the governments are and they should prioritize a cease-fire. But this is not something that only the government can do; it should be something from both sides, from all actors, including the international community.

“We realized that unless you have peace, you cannot either achieve development or, even if you achieve it, you cannot sustain those gains.” — Habib Mayar, deputy secretary-general, g7+

That’s why we welcome the call by the U.N. secretary-general for the cease-fire. That’s the most important priority for those countries which are in active conflict so that they can focus on curbing the pandemic rather than dealing with the insurgency or the civil war or the other conflict that has erupted. It will be challenging for those countries which don’t have a lot of their own resources and they depend on international aid or humanitarian assistance. The governments and the leaders have to be critical in thinking about self-sufficiency, particularly in agriculture — for example, in food production. Unfortunately, we sometimes just advocate for more aid and more assistance and more cooperation — which is, of course, needed — but we forget the fact that we need to think about our self-reliance.

How should international donors be incorporating conflict sensitivity into the pandemic response?

We have put forward four asks, and one of them is debt relief for these countries. The second thing is there is an opportunity for the international community to consider or to think again about the things they agreed in the New Deal. This is a time to take it seriously, which means that they have to take the national context into consideration. For a long time, we have been suffering from phenomena where solutions are designed outside our countries and they are just imported or imposed on them, which rarely work. One of the things that we’ve learned in this pandemic is the measures that might work in Europe might not work in these countries. This means that they have to contextualize the responses to the country. We have tools of national assessments that can inform the global response. It can inform engagement. It would mean they have to respect the national ownership — for them to trust the national leadership of these countries because they are the ones who know better how to deal with their own challenges. When I’m talking about this, I mean the humanitarian and also the development engagement with these countries. We have to use the lens of conflict sensitivity for engaging in these countries. Despite the fact that there will be [a] downturn in the global economy and we might also experience a global recession, we expect that international aid commitment is maintained to help these countries. We already saw the refugee crisis which affected the whole world. We saw the threats of terrorism and extremism. These challenges are no more the challenges of conflict-affected countries. We believe that stability in these countries is essential for global prosperity and global peace.

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Making Sure Peace Isn’t a Casualty of COVID-19 in Fragile States

9vMFy6@2e@IH — Wed, 06 May 2020 07:06:03 +0000

In World Politics Review, The g7+ Deputy General Secretary Habib Mayar and CIC’s Céline Monnier examine the risks the COVID-19 pandemic poses to fragile and conflict-affected countries, and explain six key steps to prevent a #COVID19 backlash in fragile & conflict-affected countries. “Use the response to the crisis to strengthen, not weaken, the social contract. There are many risk factors for violence in conflict-affected states, and they are often context-specific. The coronavirus pandemic is an opportunity to address them, especially when it comes to building trust in institutions, decreasing inequalities, and fostering social cohesion.

It is possible to use the response to this pandemic to advance both public health and peace if it is done right.

Governments and donors in conflict-affected countries should identify opportunities to strengthen and build trust in institutions for instance, by improving the effectiveness and inclusivity of the health system. Beyond the immediate benefits for public health, these measures will also improve public perceptions of the state as a care provider, thereby strengthening the social contract and contributing to the prevention of conflict.” Read the full article at World Politics Review here. Editor’s Note: WPR has made this article, as well as a selection of others from our COVID-19 coverage that we consider to be in the public interest, freely available for an initial two-week period.

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Opinion: How to reform aid in pursuit of stability?

9vMFy6@2e@IH — Wed, 23 Oct 2019 07:43:22 +0000

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g7+ Ministerial-Level Meeting: Access to Justice for All in Conflict-Affected Countries

9vMFy6@2e@IH — Tue, 07 May 2019 07:40:50 +0000

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The Most Significant Access to Justice Gathering in a Decade

9vMFy6@2e@IH — Wed, 27 Feb 2019 07:39:37 +0000

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Sustaining peace and shared prosperity: The question of fragile states

9vMFy6@2e@IH — Mon, 23 Jul 2018 07:45:28 +0000

By Habib Ur Rehman Mayar

Deputy General Secretary of the g7+ Secretariat

State fragility as a global challenge and global efforts to tackle it

The last decade has observed an increased number of violent conflicts that have further resulted in the loss of human lives and a level of displaced people not seen since World War II. According the latest peace index of 2017, the economic cost of violence in 2016 was US$14.3 trillion or 12.6 % of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP). The containment of violence in 2012 alone costs US$9.46 trillion or 11% of world’s GDP. The recent study on Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict conducted jointly by the World Bank (WB) (2018) and the United Nations (UN) considered conflict as the biggest obstacle to development. Recognizing the central role that states play in development, the study emphasized the need to prevent conflict as well as inclusive investment in development, in order to ensure resilience. Wars, conflict, and natural disasters leave behind a legacy of state fragility that characterizes among others, social disintegration, weak institutions, broken service delivery, and ruined infrastructure. Bringing all this back to a normal situation takes decades and huge investment.

Nearly 1.4 billion people live in countries that have been in conflict recently and that still suffer from its legacy. Lasting peace is an indispensable need of these people who constitute nearly one third of the world population. Established in 2010, the g7+ is a voluntary inter-governmental organization of 20 countries that have been affected by conflict and fragility. The main objective of the g7+ is to build peaceful societies through promoting country-led dialogue, sharing experiences, and advocating for reforms to the way that the international community engages in conflict-affected states. Progress in social and development targets in these countries have been far below average. The crises have not only reversed development gains in these countries if there were any but have also had a heavy human toll. Dealing with periods of instability, g7+ members have learned lessons and gained experiences that have rarely been documented or acknowledged. These lessons have proved useful for peers within the g7+ group. The g7+ Foundation has been established to document the stories by both leaders and citizens of g7+ members that can be used to share with other countries.

Despite the stigma of fragility that is associated with the identity of these countries, their people and state institutions demonstrate remarkable resilience as they survive in the face of tremendous challenges caused by conflicts and fragility. This contradicts the perception of passivity that many in the global community have of these countries when it comes to defining their vision and national strategy for development. In other words, they have often been subject to policies (humanitarian, security, and development) that are formed with little or no consideration of their context and ownership. International intervention in the areas of security, humanitarian, and development has been merely reactive to the consequences of fragility rather than solution to the root causes. However, agreement on the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile Situations, by the g7+, Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors, and civil society groups, offered a new opportunity for the so-called fragile states to decide their own destiny with international support. The New Deal, which was endorsed in Busan in 2011, is the first internationally agreed framework that recognizes the indispensable nexus of peace, effective state institutions, and development – a phenomenon that has recently found a central space in international discourse on peace, security, and development.

The New Deal principles and the lived experiences of the g7+ countries were the reference point for the g7+ and its partners to advocate for a stand-alone goal on peace, justice, and effective institutions within the Agenda 2030 –which is considered as the most inclusive global framework since the establishment of the UN. The New Deal has changed the narrative on fragility. The principles of the New Deal were based on the practical experiences of countries that have been able to break the vicious circle of conflict and fragility. Recognition of the unique context and ownership of the countries over their challenges and solution thereof are at core of the successful realization of the New Deal principles. The International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS) has been a unique platform that has facilitated a frank and in-depth dialogue among the g7+, donors, and civil society groups on the specific challenges facing countries in fragile situations. With the establishment of the IDPS, the so-called ‘fragile countries’ are expected to manifest their priorities at the global level. Agreement on the New Deal was a ground-breaking event that created considerable expectations for the long-waited reforms in the development and peacebuilding architecture of international, regional, and national actors.

The adoption of SDG16 within the Agenda 2030, the twin resolutions (2282-2016) of the UN General Assembly, and Security Council, respectively, the sustaining peace agenda and the recent launch of the above-mentioned study by the WB and UN, confirm the relevance of the New Deal principles. In fact, its principles are expected to help in advancing the SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals) at National level in countries affected by conflict and fragility. While the SDGs are a universal agenda, its implementation is local, particularly in conflict- affected countries, and hence, the New Deal has a role to play. However, the full potential of the New Deal principles has not yet been realized. There could and should be more obvious results in effective peacebuilding, statebuilding, and development cooperation. As the independent evaluation of the New Deal study observed, political processes have been missing to identify ‘what needs to happen and how’, since it was expected to bring about transformative change in the behavior of development and humanitarian actors (Hearn, 2016). The study further suggests that the g7+ has become an influential voice on the global stage. Hence, there has been an unprecedented opportunity to lift the profile of the principles of the New Deal. The adaption of the global frameworks related to peacebuilding and statebuilding (some of which were mentioned above) seems to have started bringing together peacebuilding, humanitarian, development, and even private investment actors in regard to fragility and conflict prevention. This has shown the need to tackle fragility at its roots, which of course will require radical reform in the way these actors have worked so far.

This will require close coordination and joint actions. However, the tendency of actors to get carried away by a new framework at the cost of fully working out what they have committed to has hindered progress in realizing the aspirations of the New Deal. Emerging themes change global discourse in the same way that a news story will remain in the headlines until replaced by something new. For example, after the launch of the New Deal, there was a lot of energy around it. There was equal inspiration on the sides of donors and g7+ countries. But as time passed by, we see progress only on the technical aspect of the New Deal as is found by its first Monitoring Report in 2014 (IDPS, 2014). In other words, it seems to be falling out of fashion, whereas it has a pioneering role in the international system and policies related to conflict and fragility. I am afraid that this might become a global norm of endorsing a new framework and agreeing on principles without attempting to realize the potential of what we have committed to. Thus, the IDPS is in need of consolidating its potential and be utilized for political dialogue rather than purely technical discussion among the g7+, donors, and civil society.

Need for realization of the New Deal principles

We are all terrified by the prospect that more than half of the world’s poorest people will be living in fragile and conflict-affected countries by the end of 2030, the timeline set to achieve the SDGs.

The downfall in the global economic outlook, coupled by the break- out of emerging conflicts, is a warning that we may run out of resources to respond to the consequences of these conflicts. Hence, there are no more options left except tackling the conflicts at their roots so that all people can live in peace and prosperity. There is a need to shift from a reactive approach to a more pro-active one, meaning pursuing long-lasting solutions. First, it is clear that building sustainable peace and stopping human suffering is an urgent priority for all nations. Given the contagious nature of conflict and violence, it is a collective responsibility to address the ongoing and potential conflicts. The current refugee crisis that has been the result of violence and fragility has affected Europe is enough to show that crisis in one part of the world will have impact beyond the boundaries of its origin. We might be able to contain the immediate impact of violence, but we cannot tackle the root cause without addressing the grievances that drive these conflicts. Pursuing country-led dialogue and reconciliation is the most affordable option to address those grievances. If the UN is serious about making its ‘sustaining peace agenda’ a reality, it should facilitate and support all possible tracks of diplomacy to stop ongoing wars and conflicts first. There are countries and champions of peace whose experience can inspire us. Despite meager resources, the g7+ group has identified its own champions of peace to promote dialogue and reconciliation through peer-learning and ‘fragile-to-fragile cooperation’. Second, sustaining peace requires strong and capable state institutions to deliver basic services (such as security, justice, and social protection) to their citizens. The delivery of these services is the ultimate responsibility of the states themselves. States need to assume this responsibility, which may further manifest their legitimacy – crucial for sustaining peace. Those countries that were fortunate enough to have their own resources at their discretion such as Timor-Leste, for example, were able to consolidate peace.

If Timor-Leste had to only rely on foreign aid to settle the IDPs (internally displaced people) during the 2006 crisis, it would have taken much longer to resettle the IDPs given the tendency of international actors not to vest ownership into hands of the leaders and people of conflict affected countries to manage the aid provided. The New Deal demands investment in the foundation of the state as articulated within the peacebuilding and statebuilding goals. While country context and ownership is a determining factor of successful transition, countries emerging from immediate conflict need resources at their discretion. Donors do provide aid to these countries, but the plans to allocate it are made in their capitals rather than in the capital of the recipient countries. Yes, those plans made by donors seem to be aligned with broader and global objectives of eradicating poverty, but that alignment rarely happens at the operational level where the National stakeholders can monitor whether the objectives of their National strategies have been achieved or not. A recent study by Oxfam on aid effectiveness in Afghanistan found that alignment of aid from a donor’s perspective, is achieved by spending money in sectors that fall within National Priority Programs (NPPs), through whichever mechanism they see fit, whereas the government identifies alignment as spending in ways that can easily monitor and attribute to their priority needs, essentially through their institutions and procedures (March 2018).

Countries need to identify their national vision, a ‘one vision’ that could be agreed upon by all stakeholders. Third, one of several challenges that countries affected by conflict and fragility face, is fragmentation at every level. This fragmentation is widened further by uncoordinated, misaligned, and parallel projects and programs by donors. The use of project implementation units (PIUs) established to implement donors’ projects is a synonym for ‘governments’ within a government. Each PIU is managed outside the structure of the relevant Ministry. One of the immediate impacts of such arrangements is the distortion of salaries, and brain drain of capacity. For example, in Sierra Leone, there were 295 projects in the ministry of finance, agriculture, and health using PIUs in 2014 (Independent Evaluation Group, 2014: 50). One can imagine how difficult it can be for the government to consolidate one strategic direction in the presence of several other plans run by different actors. In addition, a huge portion of aid is channeled outside the government system and national budget. According to the New Deal monitoring report of 2014, there has not been significant progress in honoring the commitment to using the existing country system. Budget support as a percentage of official development assistance in 21 fragile states fell from 3.5% to 1.5%. Bypassing the national budget when delivering aid means that governments and their parliaments have little or no control on the spending of the aid money. In other words, it undermines accountability and transparency. The preamble of many aid programs in conflict-affected countries promise to build state capacity, but fragmented, uncoordinated, misaligned, and unharmonized aid projects with short- sighted goals perpetuate aid dependency in these countries.

Fourth, investment in infrastructure (both physical and soft) has a leveraging impact on the potential of countries to reduce aid dependency. According to the WB’s (2011) World Development Report 2011, Conflict, Security, and Development, a lack of economic opportunities and high unemployment are key sources of fragility. Private companies create 90% of jobs worldwide. However, challenges facing private sector development in conflict affected countries include, among others, a lack of security, lack of sufficient infrastructure, and risks associated with the perceived corruption. The only industry that has attracted investment is the extractives and telecom sector. Nevertheless, in many countries, these constitute a tiny portion of overall GDP. Multi- lateral institutions usually have a ‘demand-driven’ approach to supporting the private sector. The stigma and perception of associated risks scares away potential investors. Given the significant potential for conflict-affected countries to attract private investment (local and foreign), help is needed to create a market for investment rather than waiting for one to emerge. Infrastructure is needed to connect these countries to regional and international markets. While policies to bring about investment climate reforms are not always easy for the governments of conflict-affected countries to implement, donors should help governments to overcome the most critical problems that get in the way of increased investment. Such kind of support is really an investment in prevention. Given the complexity of challenges of fragile situations that require flexible tools and resources, the above suggestions may seem like a wish list.

However, the unanimous adaption of Agenda 2030, followed by an unprecedented level of support to the sustaining peace agenda of the UN Secretary General, can be a reason for optimism. We have options to tackle fragility and stop and/or avoid conflicts. Alongside the benefits of globalization, such as the widespread uptake of technology, transport, and regional integration, we are also facing the increasing spillover of conflicts and crisis. In other words, they are no longer a problem limited to one particular country or territory but have become a shared challenge. This has been evident in the recent influx of refugees into Europe. History has taught us that whenever a challenge has become global, then no single country, rich or poor, well-armed or unarmed, and big or small, can tackle it alone. This is a hard reality we have to face. Thus, I hope that we are united in tackling conflicts and fragility from their roots and helping to build peace, resilience, and hence, enjoy ‘shared prosperity’.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. 6 Global Social Policy 00(0)

References

Hearn S (2016) Independent Review of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States. NYU Center on International Cooperation; International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. Available at: https://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/new_deal_engagement_ hearn_apr14_final.pdf Independent Evaluation Group (2014) World Bank Group Assistance to Low-Income Fragile and Conflict Affected State: An Independent Evaluation. Washington, DC: World Bank. International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS) (2014) New Deal Monitoring Report 2014. IDPS. Available at: http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/media/filer_public/a5/df/ a5dfd621-00a5-4836-8e20-8fff3afd1187/final_2014_new_deal_monitoring_report.pdf World Bank (2011) World Development Report 2011: Conflict: Security and Development. Washington, DC: World Bank, 352 pp. World Bank (2018) Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent. Washington, DC: World Bank, 341 pp.

Author biography

Habib Ur Rehman Mayar is Deputy General Secretary of the g7+ Secretariat and Executive Director of g7+ Foundation. He has served in the Secretariat since 2013 and leads on policy and advocacy for better engagement in fragile situations. Mr Mayar was Head of the Aid Coordination Unit in the Ministry of Finance, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, before joining the g7+ Secretariat. He was involved in discussions on the Paris Declaration, Accra Agenda for Action, and the Busan Partnership and participated in the negotiations on the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States.

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Forging Coherence on Two Vital Agendas for Sustainable Peace and Development: the Agenda 2030

9vMFy6@2e@IH — Sun, 01 Jan 2017 07:52:33 +0000

Exciting movements are underway in and around the United Nations for those of us concerned with issues of peace, and the global agendas seeking to operationalize, and realize, new frameworks and revitalized agendas to ensure a better world for all. Over the last year we have seen significant movements to assess and reorient United Nations’ efforts towards greater commitments to sustaining peace and preventing conflict, as signified in April 27, 2016, twin Security Council/General Assembly Resolutions. We have also seen the adoption of new global development framework – Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development – that for the first time places peace concerns prominently at its core. It does this on the one hand by placing peace one of five areas of critical importance identified in the Preamble, and by dedicating one of 17 goals to the topic of peaceful, just and inclusive societies. On January 10 of this year, new members of the Security Council Sweden took swift, admirable action to build upon the commitments laid out in the twin resolutions by hosting a Security Council ministerial level debate on sustaining peace and conflict prevention. This important debate was opened by the new United Nations Secretary General António Guterres himself, as he threw his weight squarely behind the two resolutions, promising to “rebalance” United Nations efforts and place far greater attention on preventing violent conflict. He highlighted 2017 as the year OF peace and a year FOR peace. Presently there are efforts to bring these two agendas (sustaining peace/conflict prevention and Agenda 2030) together.

In anticipation of the January 24 United Nations High Level Dialogue “Building Sustainable Peace for All: Synergies between the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Sustaining Peace” – and to introduce the first of what will hopefully be a semi-regular blog series broadly covering the topic of forging and sustaining peace – I am sharing some of my thinking that has evolved over time and in relation to my policy and practice work on issues that lie at the heart of these agendas and their intersections. It is worth stating that reflecting on parallel, and undoubtedly complementary agendas is a worthy goal – at the most basic level, to promote coherence which lies at the heart of effective peacebuilding. But it is not easy. I just had the opportunity with New Deal constituency colleagues to do precisely this – reflect upon how our New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (a framework and policy dialogue process) will align with the new Agenda 2030 – which our three constituencies (the g7+ network of countries affected by conflict, OECD/DAC donor countries – INCAF, and civil society – CSPPS – the Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Development) were very active in supporting the creation of.

The result of this six months of reflection, debate, and negotiation is here. A key argument that I want to make in this post may be obvious, but requires steadfast, genuine attention. Having concepts, frameworks and strategies is a vital starting point, but it is just that, a starting point. Ongoing ownership of these agendas is clearly what matters at the end of the day for implementation, for realization of the aspirations embedded in these agendas. Meaningfully inclusive processes lie at the core of ownership, and these processes must begin and end in countries, with appropriate nurturing and accompaniment by international actors. At the same time, we cannot deny nor neglect the reality that many drivers of conflict and fragility are transnational and international in origin and motive, and thus require international partnership to address. While these two agendas represent a profoundly important step in a growing universal consciousness about what is needed to fuel sustainable peace and development for all, there is much work to do to ensure they are owned, actively pursued, and realized at national levels. After sharing some reflections on the two agendas at hand and their important intersections, I’ll close with some thoughts on how our experiences from the New Deal – which are inextricably linked to Agenda 2030 and the twin resolutions – offer insight, and added value if effectively utilized, for bringing these two agendas together, on the ground, where it matters most.

Sustaining peace and preventing conflict

While undoubtedly many might roll their eyes at these topics being heralded anew, given that both have been around and valued, particularly by scholar-practitioners, for decades – their movement to the top of the UN agenda must simply be welcomed. It illustrates, finally, that these are not marginal issues, or issue of “low politics” in realpolitik terms. They are paramount to achieving globally agreed goals, and reflective of the widening recognition that paying for the repercussions of war is simply too costly – there needs to be a robust commitment to prevention, which has faced considerable resistance by member states over time, with concern around implications for their sovereignty, amongst other things. At the same time, certainly some will fear that escalation of these agendas to the level to the Security Council may simply create a host of new obstacles, and serve to politicize and dilute the issues. A fair concern. Though, positively, Security Council attention to climate change and HIV/AIDs appears to be more helpful than harmful. The back and forth on whether and how to address and approach issues of sustaining peace and conflict prevention over the years at the UN illustrates the profound complexities underlying questions of how to address these topics – conceptually, politically, ideologically, operationally. While a key goal of the UN is to “take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace” – enshrined in the UN Charter – the challenge of course is gaining agreement on what constitutes “threats to peace.” We know that these are often conceived of very differently by different actors – be they governments and civil societies, Northern and Southern actors, and/or members of different ethnic, racial and income groups within and across societies.

The evolution of the field of peacebuilding, and the United Nations policy documents and instruments focused on the peacebuilding agenda illustrate the challenges of achieving lasting consensus on how to conceptualize and operationalize the notion of sustaining peace, encapsulated historically in the notion of peacebuilding. While, for example, the Agenda for Peace (1992) suggested that peacebuilding was a post-conflict tool to follow peacekeeping, and the Supplement (1995) expanded the notion to refer to all stages of the conflict/peace cycle, the 2005 development of the UN’s Peacebuilding “architecture” reverted to a post-conflict understanding of its role. And despite the rising awareness of the problem of conflict recurrence and the need to address root causes and remain engaged in conflict settings, it was only seven years ago when the Secretary General, guided by the new leadership of the UN’s peacebuilding architecture, decided its primary focus should be on the “immediate aftermath” of conflict. Some of us pushed back on this. At the time, I had the opportunity with eight other scholar/policy oriented practitioners to reflect on where the UN’s peacebuilding architecture needed to go, and in my paper I argued that: “the new focus on the immediate aftermath of conflict supported by the UN’s Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) crowds out important debates surrounding potential core drivers or building blocks of sustainable peace. Strengthened efforts are needed to conceptually and practically link this ‘early recovery’ period with longer-term peace.”

I then examined five “core drivers of peace sustainability,” drawing on scholarly and policy literature and practice, around:

1) peace operations and sustaining international commitment;

2) coordination, integration, transition, strategy – particularly around the strategies, frameworks and processes for addressing drivers and root causes of conflict;

3) national capacity development, for conflict management; 4) economic recovery; 5) addressing obstacles to peace sustainability,

i.e. proliferation of unregulated armed groups and their lack of attention in post-conflict DDR and SSR processes (receiving more attention today thankfully), poorly regulated natural resources, illicit drugs and organized crime; lack of trust in peace processes and lack of political will and appropriate mandates for which progress can be measured and actors held accountable. These five drivers I believe remain central, both for sustaining peace and preventing conflict – in particular conflict renewal or reversion, but also simply preventing new conflict – especially driver 3 – building on the longstanding commitments, often not honored, to put national actors in the driver’s seat of change in their countries. Thankfully attention is now reignited towards thinking about what sustains peace, not just in the immediate aftermath of conflict, but over the long-term. This movement, embraced in the two twin resolutions, grew from findings of the 2015 “AGE” report – a study by an Advisory Group of Experts (AGE) as part of the review process mandated by the Security Council and the General Assembly for the tenth anniversaries of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). The twin resolutions highlight sustaining peace in a way that reorients the notion of peacebuilding to one that must take place in all phases – as an effort that happens before, during and after conflict – thus making it a responsibility of the whole UN – and not just one agency. According to the resolutions and drawing from the AGE report, sustaining peace: “should be broadly understood as goal and a process to build a common vision of society, ensuring that the needs of all segments of the population are taken into account, which encompasses activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict, addressing root causes, assisting parties to conflict to end hostilities, ensuring national reconciliation, and moving towards recovery, reconstruction and development, and emphasizing that sustaining peace is a shared task and responsibility that needs to be fulfilled by the government and all other national stakeholders, and should flow through all three pillars of the United Nations’ engagement at all stages of conflict, and in all its dimensions, and needs sustained international attention and assistance,”

Those who follow the UN and more generally debates over the years on peacebuilding know that there is nothing terribly new here. But again, accepting it at the level of Security Council and General Assembly through formal resolutions is new, signaling high level commitments upon which concerted action can be built. It is also refreshing to see this level, finally, of commitment to the notion of “root causes” – which has been the subject of great waffling and substantive debate over the years (I summarize in this piece). The important point here is that national actors must ultimately retain responsibility for addressing root causes, while the outstanding question of what role international actors have in this regard remains poignant. I have argued in this same piece that we can facilitate space, and accompany. Of course it becomes complicated if national governments are totally unwilling to move in the direction of addressing root causes. In such cases – DRC, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and even Zimbabwe come to mind – fragility prevails. In this sense the resolutions underscore the inherently political nature of peacebuilding – though I believe more needs to be done to unveil what this means for operationalizing the sustaining peace agenda. Particularly as we reflect upon links with the development agenda, which thankfully now has more political entry points than the previous, Millennium Development agenda – notably with Goal 16. Other welcome elements of this conceptualization, are the notion of the common vision of society (which suggests entry points for national development planning processes, and the national prioritization of goals and targets needed to realize Agenda 2030 within countries), and the underscoring of the need for inclusive processes, highlighting women and youth, amongst wider civil society. This reflects the formalization of this emerging norm of inclusivity in peacemaking and peacebuilding – of course welcome news for civil society interests around the world. Sadly, these commitments face challenges globally with shrinking space for civil society to operate where governments feel threatened and prefer closed systems. These commitments also may face grave challenges in the context of a Trump presidency if prevailing prognoses are right – where authoritarian and extremist political processes, globally, will be empowered in this new era.

The 2030 Agenda, and sustaining peace

Few would argue that the 2030 agenda is not an outstanding achievement, offering tremendous value for truly linking development and peace agendas. Member states (from the North, South, and especially conflict-affected countries) were joined by international organizations and civil society globally to bring about the “peace” priorities and perspectives in the 2030 agenda. In a recent piece I authored on civil society’s role in the 2030 agenda, I describe and reflect on this process. Of particular relevance to this question of the links with the sustainable peace agenda, I assessed what is needed to ensure that the 2030 agenda is truly transformative – that is – that it will foster sustainable peace within and across societies in ways that ultimately serve to transform the root causes of violence, conflict, and fragility. Three priorities, I suggested as fundamental starting points to ensure this, are:

Address or hold promise of addressing common drivers of conflict and violence on the one hand, and peace and resilience on the other – globally, within and across member states;
Offer ongoing pathways for meaningful inclusion of societal actors; and
Provide clear implementation and financing mechanisms.

I’ll reflect primarily on the more substantive rather than operational aspects of the first two, here, building on my analysis in the aforementioned chapter. The third point is equally, and profoundly important – nothing will materialize without clear implementation and financing mechanisms, and the new Secretary General’s commitment to placing issues of sustaining peace and preventing conflict at the top of his agenda for UN reform and action is a highly welcome starting point. Addressing drivers On the first point, it will be natural to focus attention on Goal 16 in the 2030 Agenda. Indeed, Goal 16 addresses both internal drivers of violent conflict (lack of access to justice, corruption, unaccountable institutions, exclusive decision making at national and sub-national levels) and external ones (illicit financial and arms flows, organized crime, exclusive global governance). However, other goals and targets are highly relevant for achieving sustainable peace – as reflected by the inclusion of peace in the preamble of the 2030 Agenda connotes. Notably, Goal 10 (on reducing inequalities) and Goal 5 (gender) are highly relevant for transforming structures and institutions, and ultimately shifting power relations at multiple levels a foundation for achieving genuine, just, and sustainable peace in and across countries.

Goals 1 and 2, addressing poverty, food security and agriculture are deeply entwined with ensuring that the basic material conditions required for a decent existence provide a core foundation for peace – long argued, in particular, by African thinkers and policymakers. Additionally, as attention rightly rises on the profound and frightening interconnections between fragility and violent conflict and the environment, and notably, the drivers and impacts of climate change, Goals 12-15 also require a peace lens. Goals dealing with social services and infrastructure too, can and must be addressed in conflict and peace sensitive ways, a fairly well studied but not sufficiently implemented topic. And the rising attention to cities and sustainable peace is even starting to garner the attention it deserves. It is also argued that the framework could go further in addressing structural drivers of conflict and fragility – particularly to align with the agenda of sustaining peace and the goal to address root causes. I have heard Global South activists argue that the framework is not sufficiently transformative because it does not fundamentally shift the macro-economic fundamentals and reposition country economies so that they are not so vulnerable to global economic volatility–processes that creates poverty and inequality in the first place. It also does not provide pathways for redistributive justice i.e. addressing contexts where there are serious disparities of land and resources that fuel conflict.

This was also a limitation in the World Bank’s hallmark 2011 WDR on Conflict, Security and Development, that argued the need for focus on investing in citizen security, justice and jobs to reduce violence and strengthen institutions over the long haul. The framework is also suspiciously missing reference to mechanisms to foster reconciliation, conflict resolution and peace-making, and more generally the social and relational side of social cohesion, at all levels within society. During the development of the Agenda, these issues were consistently advocated for by civil society – (as evident in statements informing the Agenda’s development, on www.cspps.org). They were also featured in the New Deal Common Indicators after extensive debate amongst stakeholders. It is also important to underscore that the peaceful, just and inclusive societies dimension of the 2030 Agenda is much greater than just Goal 16. The framework is clearly unprecedented in bringing together a broad range of structural issues that often underlie or contribute to violent conflict and fragility, alongside and embedded within traditional development objectives, as it puts forth an expansive range of targets (169) covering political, economic and social realms, to affect them. While Goal 16 was by all accounts a magnanimous achievement, it came with some expense to a concerted effort to mainstream a peace and conflict lens throughout the framework. Adopting one central goal can foster a concerning perception that “peace” is associated with primarily security, governance and rule of law activities – which can too easily be dismissed as a Northern/Western agenda. We must continue to draw upon decades of evolutionary thought to ensure it is perceived as an integrated concept, with inclusive development also at its core, and seek to ensure that “peace” in the development framework includes goals and targets throughout, that together encompass the potential for significant change at country and international levels. In this spirit, the Center for Cooperation at NYU has prepared a useful analysis that makes the case for an integrated approach to peaceful, just and inclusive societies. Pathways for Inclusion The second area concerns the ways in which the framework and its implementation offer ongoing pathways for inclusive participation.

The 2030 Agenda addresses these issues in myriad ways, notably, by effectively mainstreaming the concept of inclusivity through many of its goals: education (Goal 4), economic growth and full employment (Goal 8), infrastructure (Goal 9), cities (Goal 11), societies and institutions (Goal 16). By emphasizing participation and inclusion in a range of issues that are often interactive and interdependent, the Agenda addresses power asymmetries, and the exclusionary policies that fuel violence and violent conflict, in a way that most official peacebuilding agreements do not. Central to realizing results in this area will be how the pathways for participation are actively forged, in particular, at national levels, but also globally, with stronger participation of Global South actors. In my chapter I highlight some of the weaknesses of the Agenda 2030 process, notably the much more influential role that northern civil society was able to have in the Agenda’s development, undoubtedly, given that much of the technical and political elements of the process unfolded in New York. It will be vital that all working for the cause of peace endeavor to “connect the dots” – that is, build meaningful linkages between the inclusion agendas at different levels, towards ensuring that inclusion at one level (i.e. the peace processes, where advances are being made to encourage this both within the UN and by important civic efforts) transmits into other levels, sectors, processes, and notably, results. I make this case in reflecting on the New Deal, how our concerted efforts have sought to understand and promote inclusion not just as a policy goal in terms of process, but in actualizing more inclusive results. Agenda 2030 provides entry points for those working in and on negotiating inclusive peace agreements, to reflect and engage deeply on the pathways for ensuring these issues translate into policy and programmatic results. This of course demands within the United Nations context, that those leading on peace operations – the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department for Political Affairs (DPA) for starters, genuinely come together the United Nations Development Program and other UN agencies to ensure that their strategic frameworks and processes foster meaningful ways to link the political and developmental with national actors at the helm.

The challenge – as I’ve argued in numerous places, perhaps first here – is that many of these upstream processes are more heavily managed by the UN, rather than national actors, thus undermining the notion that peacebuilding strategies are and must be nationally led endeavors – which is the priority in national development planning processes (and Agenda 2030), supported by UN agencies and especially UNDP. The goal of truly ensuring national actors are in the drivers’ seat in peacebuilding and development processes requires confronting this tension. Enter the New Deal. Conclusion: The New Deal and the Role of the International Dialogue International Dialogue constituencies were heavily engaged in the shaping of efforts around Goal 16 and wider peace related language in Agenda 2030. While the development of the New Deal predated Agenda 2030 efforts, the global agenda was seen as a North Star, to bring the New Deal inspired concerns and priorities to the highest policy level and to ensure the greatest impact for all. At the same time, the adoption of the 2030 Agenda – lauded by all New Deal constituencies – presented a challenge: what now is the role for the New Deal? After much deliberation we have made the clear casefor the continuing central importance of the New Deal in countries affected by conflict and fragility. In sum, we argue that the New Deal offers a set of processes and specific instruments that will support selection, prioritisation and implementation of SDGs in ways that create inclusive dialogue around the nature of what they mean in specific contexts, and how they can be implemented and monitored most effectively – and in ways that concertedly support addressing and not aggravating the drivers of conflict and fragility. Not only are these principles representative of good development practice and specifically aligned to fragile and conflict settings, they are also already negotiated and agreed by IDPS stakeholders. Ownership of these principles is strong, and growing, and thus will necessarily support effective realization of the SDGs. Further, the multi-stakeholder International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding represents exactly the kind of partnership envisioned in Agenda 2030’s Goal 17. This partnership can be used and built upon to realize the ambitions of the 2030 Agenda. Most importantly for this reflection at hand on how to bring these two agendas (sustaining peace/conflict prevention and Agenda 2030) together – the New Deal offers practical, concrete experience and deep insight into the how to pursue both agendas in an integrated way.

This is precisely what the International Dialogue has been endeavoring – through years of often quite delicate political dialogue – to do. While evaluations on our successes and failures have been undertaken, the key areas of added value in my view for this discussion are three:

New Deal processes have sought to bring analysis of conflict and fragility to bear, on political decision-making and development planning;
New Deal instruments have grappled with and continue to grapple with myriad political tensions involved in bringing key actors into dialogue around historical, structural, and fundamentally political challenges in fomenting meaningful change – both in terms of how the international aid architecture works and needs to work and in how governments can and need to more effectively engage their societies in these processes as a starting point;
New Deal processes have operationally brought societal constituencies (and international constituencies) together in meaningful ways, and catalyzed and institutionalized (in different countries, with varying degrees of success) inclusive processes that link the peacemaking/peacebuilding and development spheres – with a focus on both processes and results.

New Deal processes have sought to bring analysis of conflict and fragility to bear, on political decision-making and development planning;
New Deal instruments have grappled with and continue to grapple with myriad political tensions involved in bringing key actors into dialogue around historical, structural, and fundamentally political challenges in fomenting meaningful change – both in terms of how the international aid architecture works and needs to work and in how governments can and need to more effectively engage their societies in these processes as a starting point;
New Deal processes have operationally brought societal constituencies (and international constituencies) together in meaningful ways, and catalyzed and institutionalized (in different countries, with varying degrees of success) inclusive processes that link the peacemaking/peacebuilding and development spheres – with a focus on both processes and results.

It is the case that these have been attempted and achieved with varying degrees of success. And while the New Deal can be critiqued for this, the efforts in g7+ countries by both governments and civil societies have in many cases been tremendous, and are ongoing. It would be a futile waste of resources and morally debilitating for those who have devoted their time, energy and resources, to not ensure that Agenda 2030 and sustaining peace agenda efforts build upon these efforts in g7+ countries. This can start with a more concerted engagement between actors engaged in these agendas, and it must occur at all levels. While undoubtedly there are political dynamics at play mediating for and against the inclusion and larger voice of different constituencies and actors and substantive concerns – what cannot be debated any longer is that these agendas must be fundamentally driven by national actors. Within the International Dialogue process, g7+ countries (governments and their civil societies) are taking a profound lead in agreeing to, and adopting, a courageous stance and needed actions to move their countries forward in ways that both challenge needed, structural problems in the international aid architecture, and, in ways that have them take ownership of domestic obstacles to meaningful change. This is a process that will take time, that requires ongoing engagement and support of all constituencies and partners. The author thanks Peter van Sluijs and Richard Ponzio for helpful comments.

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Countries in conflict must lead peace process for World Humanitarian Summit to succeed

9vMFy6@2e@IH — Sun, 01 May 2016 08:24:01 +0000

Let’s hope old habits don’t get in the way of what is truly in the interests of people affected by conflict and crisis

World leaders will be gathering in Istanbul, Turkey this week during the World Humanitarian Summit; a first time event since the inception of the United Nations. Officials from conflict-affected countries will be there, trying to share what they go through, and listening carefully to what will be decided. The Secretary General of the UN (UNSG) has submitted a call for One Humanity – Shared Responsibility; a reminder to the world of the preamble of the United Nations charter signed by more than 190 nations. The five “core responsibilities” he identifies are highly relevant, and we hope that the UN will have the courage to also critically review its own role within the global governance system. However, the execution of these ambitious plans will require world leaders to nurture states organically, rather than using imposed means, and to live up to the commitments made in 2011 in theNew Deal for engagement in fragile states.

The top 10 countries receiving humanitarian aid in 2015 were all affected by conflict, and the UNSG has rightly made his first “core responsibility” that of preventing and ending conflict. Conflict has become more protracted, with the average conflict lasting 37 years in 2013, compared to 19 years in 1990. In today’s interconnected world, wars and conflicts do not leave behind winners or losers, and instead leave behind wounds that permeate through regions and across oceans. Meanwhile,beneficiary perceptions of humanitarian responses are lowand it seems that sensitivity to local context is lost in the saviour complex of humanitarian aid. Five years ago a framework defining principles for engagement in conflict-affected countries was launched in the similar but less global event of the 4th High Level Forum on aid effectiveness in Busan, in the home country of the UN Secretary General.

The New Deal for engagement in fragile states was born out of iteration and review of country experiences. The countries and organizations who endorse the “New Deal” include major OECD bilateral donors and multilaterals such as the World Bank and UN agencies. On the recipient side were countries which had experienced and still experience conflict and violence, who now form a Group of 20 nations called the g7+. The New Deal agreed 5 Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (Inclusive and legitimate politics, Security, Justice, Economic foundations, and Revenue and services) to be considered the foundations to help (re)build these countries. These PSGs should be worked towards using the New Deal’s TRUST principles of partnership and aid effectiveness, and with a FOCUS on country context and priorities. I view the New Deal principles as equating to a country-level version of the 5 core responsibilities advocated for by the UNSG. The essence of both the call for One Humanity – Shared Responsibility and New Deal principles is the recognition of the state and its society’s ownership of defining and addressing its challenges, in the light of their specific contexts.

Recognition of local realities will make indispensable the redefinition and reconsideration of international norms that to date have been tacitly or otherwise defined. Through the different experiences of the g7+ member countries, we have found that states and their societies need to be given space and support to manifest a country-sensitive peace agenda, even if they have to patch up the peace for the time being. International values such as the democracy agenda are manifested against the nature and context of countries, oblivious to the fact that these values take decades to nurture. In order to realize the vision of strengthening political sources to address conflict, we need to invest in and support the organic politics of countries in a way that is responsive and accounts for the country context. The international aid system should avoid fragmentation on one hand, and become flexible enough to accommodate the varying needs of a country on the other. While the expected impact of the New Deal principles has not gone far enough and may still need even greater political will, they have provided an opportunity for an international dialogue to frankly negotiate what works well and what doesn’t in complex post-conflict situations, for example as regards peace-building. Our experience says that there is a need to mobilize an international community of champions for peace to help in reconciliation and ensuring peace in countries affected by conflict.

The little g7+ has tried to share our experiences under our Council of Eminent Persons as part of what we call fragile-to-fragile cooperation; we are sure this work has more potential if we mobilize more champions of peace. In the preparations for the Summit and the actions that will follow, I hope that world leaders will agree on a roadmap to peace that considers the realities and choices of people in crisis. The instruments used and implementation modalities chosen will determine the success of future actions. Let’s hope the powerful in the humanitarian world don’t let old habits and entrenched ways of working get in the way of what is truly in the interests of the people affected by conflict and crisis. I wish the UNSG every success in the approval of this agenda. Habib Ur Rehman Mayar is Deputy General Secretary of the g7+ Secretariat. The g7+ Group is a voluntary association of the world’s poorest countries affected by conflict and fragility. He was head of aid coordination at the Ministry of Finance, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, before joining the g7+ Secretariat.

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Striking extreme poverty by 2030: How can the New Deal help?

9vMFy6@2e@IH — Fri, 01 Apr 2016 08:20:24 +0000

The message of the g7+group of conflict-affected and fragile countries is clear.Solutions to conflict and poverty only work when they are nationally-owned and led . That might seem obvious, but the international community has learned the hard way that externally-imposed priorities do not add up to peace and sustainable institutions that drive development. The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States is a set of partnership principles for ending conflict and poverty. Agreed by the g7+ member countries, it commits them to goals for inclusive politics, security, justice, laying the foundations for economic growth, and collecting revenues to provide services. These peacebuilding and statebuilding goals are the basis for fighting extreme poverty . The “deal” part of the equation hinges on compacts that bind together government, society and international partners towards the collective pursuit of these common goals, and mutual accountability for progress. In 2015 and 2016, I led a team that reviewed the New Deal and the progress it has made so far. Suffice to say, simply signing up to the New Deal is not the panacea.

Since its launch in 2011, the New Deal has been criticized for being too technical, for low uptake among national political leaders and international partners, and for not sufficiently involving society. But the New Deal could strike the definitive blow against extreme poverty in the next fifteen years . One billion people could escape extreme poverty by 2030 if countries can resolve conflict and crisis, and build inclusive, accountable and effective enough institutions. Writing off the New Deal before it has had time to gain momentum should be inconceivable. In fact I find the opposite; we need to redouble our efforts behind it, and fast. The New Deal has already made one very important difference. The g7+ are global norm entrepreneurs. The New Deal has empowered the g7+ by elevating their messages on the world stage. In 2015, the world agreed that building peaceful and inclusive societies, access to justice and accountable, effective and inclusive institutions is a global development goal. This is history. It’s the first time poor and fragile countries have shaped global goals, and it’s the first time the world has agreed that peace, justice and institutions are universal development priorities. Inside the g7+ countries, implementation has not always been easy. Ministries of Finance and Planning have proven crucial champions of the New Deal. They have found innovative ways to incorporate and measure progress in peacebuilding and statebuilding in national development strategies in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste.

In 2013, Somalia and the international community signed a New Deal Compact, which has helped to put government in the driving seat and to align aid to national priorities for peacebuilding and statebuilding. But parliaments, the private sector, private citizens groups and media have too often been missing from the equation. South Sudan’s relapse into conflict, for example, followed a dialogue between government and partners that addressed building the state’s public finance mechanics, but not politics, security and justice; and opposition and civil society did not have a seat at the table. Without inclusive processes to set priorities, we can have little confidence that “what” we are pursuing and “how” will build peace – we are operating on too many assumptions. These challenges reflect a need for political leaders to recommit to the principles of the New Deal, and especially to political processes that bind all relevant actors into a shared vision for what needs to happen and how to build peace and fight poverty. Leading national processes to assess the causes of crisis and to agree solutions is not easy, and so the g7+’s own fragile-to-fragile cooperation initiative promises to be an increasingly powerful mechanism for sharing advice and experience between g7+ countries. International partners can do much more to fulfill their side of the New Deal bargain . g7+ governments and societies need time and political space to resolve conflict and crisis, and coherent, predictable and timely assistance to develop national institutions and to fill finance gaps. Yet, I found limited evidence of behavior change in the international community as a result of signing on to the New Deal.

The breadth of the new Sustainable Development Goals could further fragment aid and development partners and so make matters worse, while the growing financial pressures on the humanitarian system can only be eased through investing more in fragile countries to prevent crisis and build self-reliance in the first place. It is time to commit to a new package of smarter aid modalities that build institutions, resilience and self-reliance, and that are counter-cyclical to help countries in times of crisis. Actors should agree a traffic light system to hold themselves more accountable for innovation in support of nationally-owned and led plans. If the New Deal didn’t exist, it would need to be invented to strike the definitive blow against global poverty . It’s time to galvanize behind it, by mobilizing governments, citizens and partners behind a new generation of politically-led strategy, planning and programming, and new global and regional partnerships for leaving no-one behind by 2030. The world must now rally to the g7+ under the global pledge of Sustainable Development Goal 17 to partnerships for the goals. Source: blogs.worldbank.org Wittten by: Sarah Hearn

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Equip fragile and conflict-affected states to harness their tax potential

9vMFy6@2e@IH — Tue, 01 Mar 2016 08:09:41 +0000

The proverb, “Give a man a fish and feed him for a day; teach him to fish and feed him for life” is old, but the emphasis on helping countries to help themselves, and fund their own development, has increased lately. Although I am not sure whether there have ever really been hungry people sat helplessly by well-stocked fisheries, many countries do have untapped tax potential. The motive behind promoting “self-reliance” may be the current financial crisis (fewer fish?) or the acceptance that poverty eradication and public services are the ultimate responsibility of the domestic state; if others really want to help in the spirit of solidarity, they must support state capacity rather than establish parallel systems. While the tax revenue mobilized by fragile states, relative to the size of their economies, is low, less than 15 percent of GDP in some countries, it plays a vital role in restoring peace and building resilience. Without domestic revenue, governments cannot provide the basic services that contribute to restoring citizens’ trust in the state, and strengthen the chances for durable peace.

The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States recognizes the peacebuilding and statebuilding role of domestic resource mobilization. Tax revenues give states the discretion to allocate resources in line with their own priorities, which less often find a place on donors’ lists of projects. Governments in least developed and fragile countries have undertaken reforms that have led to increasing revenues, with the support of donors such as the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, Germany’s GIZ, and international financial institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. It’s a simple fact that public revenue in the form of taxes and customs duties come from the economic activity of citizens and business people, domestic and foreign. Where do they get taxable income? Are there enough jobs to generate taxable wage income and do investors see a prospect for profit and feel confident enough to invest? Today much of the support offered by donors comes in the form of technical assistance to revenue authorities to help reform tax policy and administrative capacity. Of course it’s important that tax design is efficient and revenue departments have the capacity to collect them, but this narrow focus on taxation is not enough to help fragile states achieve fiscal self-reliance. Success will depend on improving the investment climate and stimulating job creation. Support for domestic revenue mobilization must be organized around the following principles: 1. Self-reliance through increasing domestic revenue should be part of the broader political agenda. Tax reforms will flounder without political support donors must think and work politically and support country priorities.

Public administration reforms in countries such as Pakistan have failed because of a lack of understanding about the political context of the country. 2. Donors must focus productive investments on key sectors that contribute to fiscal stability such as infrastructure and agriculture, while keeping political economy in mind. Agriculture often employs the majority of citizens, and is the main source of foreign exchange. Infrastructure is the foundation of the economy: in difficult environments the costs are high but the returns are manyfold. 3. International cooperation is needed to stem losses at the border. Every year billions of dollars flow out of developing countries in the form of illicit flows. Investments are urgently needed in customs systems. 4. The impact on the local economy and the fiscal sustainability of the recipient should play a more prominent role in how donors evaluate and monitor aid projects. According to a study by Oxfam about 40 percent of aid to Afghanistan goes back to donor countries. Doing development in fragile states is difficult, but they are fertile ground if managed and administered in right way. The citizens of these countries may have endured miseries but they are resilient in nature and seek prosperity. If equipped with right tools and opportunities, things will change fairly quickly.

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Fragile to fragile: How the g7+ is bringing optimism to the Central African Republic

9vMFy6@2e@IH — Tue, 05 Jan 2016 08:12:54 +0000

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